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Samenvatting
RIES is een reeks systemen (RIES-2004, RIES-KOA, RIES-2008) voor elektronische verkiezin­
gen via het Internet. Het is in de praktijk gebruikt voor middelgrote verkiezingen voor 
Waterschappen, en voor in het buitenland verblijvende kiezers bij parlementsverkiezingen.
We geven een beschrijving en analyse van de veiligheid van RIES, gebaseerd op de ons ter 
beschikking gestelde documentatie. Het doel is RIES begrijpelijker te maken voor alle be­
langhebbenden: beleidmakers, wetenschappers, verkiezingsambtenaren, implementatoren, 
en het grote publiek. Dit document maakt expliciet wat de aannames zijn bij RIES, welke 
beperkingen er aan kleven, welk veiligheidsniveau wordt bereikt, enz., gericht op beveilig­
ingsaspecten, zowel de technische als de organisatorische en procedurele.
RIES integreert stemmen per Internet met stemmen per post, en is in die specifieke con­
text ontwikkeld. Dat legt het kader vast van de eisen volgens welke RIES ontworpen is, 
namelijk in vergelijking met systemen voor stemmen per post. Vandaar dat enkele rede­
lijke vereisten voor verkiezingen (zoals stemvrijheid) vanaf het begin niet gehaald konden 
worden. Een gevolg is dat de algemene vereisten voor stemsystemen zoals geformuleerd 
door de Commissie Korthals Altes niet allemaal gehaald worden: zowel stemvrijheid als 
vertrouwelijkheid worden niet structureel door het ontwerp van RIES gegarandeerd.
RIES bouwt op cryptografische primitieven, zoals eenmalige handtekeningen. Sleutels 
voor kiezers worden centraal aangemaakt. Er zijn geen anonieme kanalen. De structurele 
bescherming en beveiliging die de cryptografie kan bieden is daardoor nogal beperkt. Veel 
garanties van RIES zijn daardoor gebaseerd op organisatorische maatregelen, met name 
de aanmaak van kiezers-sleutels, de productie van stembrieven, aanvallen door ingewijden 
(vooral op de server), integriteit en authenticiteit van de software, en helpdesk-procedures.
RIES-2008 is in een open sfeer ontworpen en gebouwd. De broncode en documentatie zullen 
binnenkort publiek beschikbaar komen voor analyse. Daarnaast hebben de ontwerpers en 
organisatoren veel werk gestoken in het publiek bespreken van hun systeem.
De technische en organisatorische inrichting lijkt zorgvuldig ontworpen te zijn. Er zijn 
echter pragmatische elementen in het systeem— zoals het gebruik van vervangende stem- 
pakketten—die aangegrepen kunnen worden voor manipulatie en misbruik, met name door 
ingewijden. Het RIES-systeem voor stemmen per Internet kent mogelijk ook gevaarlijke 
manieren voor het manipuleren van verkiezingen, die in principe op grote schaal toepasbaar 
zijn en afwijken van die bij verkiezingen per post.
Een van de onderscheidende aspecten van RIES is dat onafhankelijke tellingen van het 
eindresultaat mogelijk is, alsook individuele stemcontrole. Dit is een interessante en nuttige 
eigenschap van RIES, die echter de structurele zwakheden niet compenseert.
W ij zien RIES (m.n. RIES-2008) als een project dat waardevolle praktische ervaring en 
expertise oplevert over hoe een elektronische verkiezing georganiseerd en gehouden kan 
worden. RIES-2008 is niet geschikt voor gebruik buiten een context van verkiezingen per 
post, in het bijzonder niet voor ‘algemene’ verkiezingen (zoals voor nationale of Europese 
parlementen of plaatselijke of regionale raden en staten). We juichen verder onderzoek, 
ontwikkeling en experimenten toe om daarmee meer ervaring op te doen op dit gebied.
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Summary
RIES is an evolving family of systems (RIES-2004, RIES-KOA, RIES-2008) for electronic 
elections via the Internet. It has been used in practice for medium scale elections for the 
Dutch District Water Control Boards and for expatriates in national parliament elections.
We describe and analyze the security of RIES, based on the documentation made available 
to us. The aim is to make RIES easier to understand for all parties involved: policy 
makers, scientists, election officials, implementors, and the general public. This document 
makes explicit what the assumptions in RIES are, what kind of restrictions apply, what 
level of security is achieved, etc., focussing on the security aspects, both technical and 
organizational / procedural.
RIES provides integration of Internet voting and voting by regular mail, and has been de­
veloped in that specific context. This has set the framework of requirements for the design 
of RIES to comparison with postal voting systems. Hence certain reasonable goals for elec­
tions (like vote freedom) have been out of scope from the start. Consequently, the general 
voting requirements formulated by the Korthals Altes Committee are not all satisfied: not 
only vote freedom but also vote integrity and confidentiality are not structurally guaranteed 
in the RIES design.
RIES is built on certain cryptographic primitives, like one-time signatures. Keys for indi­
vidual voters are generated centrally. There are no anonymous channels. The structural 
protection and safeguards offered by cryptography are therefore rather limited. Many of the 
guarantees in RIES thus rely on organizational controls, notably with respect to (voter) 
key generation, production of postal packages, insider attacks (especially at the server), 
integrity and authenticity of the software, and helpdesk procedures.
RIES-2008 is designed and built in an open spirit. Its source code and documentation will 
shortly be available openly for inspection and analysis. Additionally, the designers and 
organizers have put considerable effort in publicly explaining and discussing their system.
The technical and organizational set-up seems carefully designed. There are however prag­
matic elements in the system— such as the use of replacement packages— that are open to 
manipulation and abuse, notably by insiders. The RIES Internet election system also offers 
potentially dangerous ways for manipulation of elections, in principle applicable on a large 
scale and different from attacks on postal elections.
One of the distinguishing aspects of RIES is that it allows independent recounts of the final 
outcome and individual checks to see if own votes have been included. This interesting and 
useful feature does however not compensate for the structural weaknesses.
In a larger context we see RIES (esp. RIES-2008) as a project that yields valuable hands-on 
experience and expertise on how to organize and run electronic elections. We do not think 
RIES-2008 is a suitable system for use outside a context of postal elections, and in par­
ticular not for ‘general’ elections (like for national/European parliaments or local/regional 
councils). We do encourage further research, development and experiments to gain more 
experience in this area.
version 1.0, June 24, 2008 iv
Description and Analysis of RIES
Contents
1 In troduc tion  1
1.1 The origin of R IE S ................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Aim and scope of this report .............................................................................  2
2 Requirem ents for In ternet voting systems 3
3 C ryptographic characteristics of In ternet voting systems 5
3.1 General characteristics.........................................................................................  5
3.2 Characteristics of the RIES pro toco l................................................................. 6
3.3 Succinct cryptographic description of the RIES protoco l............................... 6
4 Description of the R IE S  design 8
4.1 Data structures...................................................................................................... 8
4.1.1 Identifiers................................................................................................... 9
4.1.2 Cryptographic Keys ................................................................................  10
4.1.3 Cryptographically derived codes ........................................................... 11
4.1.4 Paper forms................................................................................................ 12
4.1.5 F ile s ............................................................................................................  13
4.2 Phases .....................................................................................................................  14
4.2.1 Initialization - overview..........................................................................  16
4.2.2 Initialization - in d e ta i l ..........................................................................  19
4.2.3 Vote collection - overview.......................................................................  22
4.2.4 Vote collection - in detail: Casting a vote by In te rn e t ...................... 22
4.2.5 Vote collection - in detail: Casting a vote by mail ............................ 27
4.2.6 Vote collection - in detail: Helpdesk....................................................  28
4.2.7 Vote collection - in detail: M onitoring.................................................  31
4.2.8 Tallying - overview...................................................................................  32
4.2.9 Tallying - in detail: tally process........................................................... 32
4.2.10 Tallying - in detail: U M P IR E ................................................................. 35
4.2.11 Finalization................................................................................................ 36
4.3 Components ............................................................................................................  38
4.3.1 Voter PC and Internet Connection.......................................................  38
4.3.2 RIES System Architecture .......................................................................  39
4.4 The cryptographic p ro toco l................................................................................  41
version 1.0, June 24, 2008 v
Description and Analysis of RIES
5 Security analysis of R IE S  44
5.1 Some Issues............................................................................................................  44
5.1.1 Forging Votes............................................................................................. 44
5.1.2 Secure P C s ................................................................................................ 45
5.1.3 Status of cryptanalysis for the cryptographic mechanisms...............  45
5.2 Verification of the requirements..........................................................................  46
6 Conclusion 49
version 1.0, June 24, 2008 vi
Description and Analysis of RIES
1 Introduction
1.1 The origin of R IE S
In 2004, voting over the Internet has been presented as an option (next to the traditional 
voting by mail) by the Dutch District Water Control Boards Rijnland and De Dommel. For 
this purpose RIES-2004 was developed, the first practical implementation of the RIES con­
cept. RIES stands for Rijnland Internet Election System. The main reason for introducing 
Internet voting was to increase the turnover, which traditionally was quite low for these 
District Water Control Board elections. About 120 000 voters (out of 2.2 million eligible 
voters) used RIES-2004 to cast their votes via the Internet.
The basic idea of RIES comes from a master thesis [26] by a student Herman Robers, 
written under supervision of Piet Maclaine Pont. This system was based upon smartcards 
(for holding the voter’s secret key and for cryptographic operations) and was used as a 
starting point for RIES, of which Maclaine Pont is the main designer. However, there are 
some major differences:
• Because of the cost aspect it was out of the question to give each potential voter a 
multi-function smartcard. Therefore RIES uses a different system for key management 
and authentication.
• Robers’s system is a purely electronic voting system. RIES is not, since it also provides 
the possibility to vote by regular mail.
• Robers’s system makes a strict distinction between several roles within the system: 
the authority, the anonymizer and the voter. In RIES this distinction is less clear.
One of the main distinguishing features of RIES is that it enables voters to verify after the 
election is closed that their own votes have been counted correctly, and that the result of 
the tally corresponds to the cast votes.
In 2006, a modified version, called RIES-KOA1, was made available to Dutch voters outside 
the Netherlands, to enable them to use the Internet to take part in the November elections 
for members of the Parliament. Almost 20 000 voters used RIES-KOA to vote by Internet.
This year (2008), an enhanced version, called RIES-2008, is being developed for Internet 
and regular mail elections for all Dutch District Water Control Boards, which will take 
place in November 2008, with an estimated number of 12.3 million eligible voters. W ith 
an expected turnover of 20-40% of which 50-75% may use Internet voting, the number of 
Internet voters using RIES-2008 might very well considerably exceed 1 million. At the time 
of writing (June 2008) a decision on its actual use still has to be made.
RIES is patented [14] by Maclaine Pont and the Rijnland District Water Control Board. All 
RIES applications were designed and implemented by Arnout Hannink’s company Magic 
Choice, owning the source code. An intentional agreement has been signed in which all
1KOA stands for Kiezen Op Afstand, i.e. Voting Remotely.
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RIES intellectual property rights, including patents and source code, will be transferred 
to the Unie van Waterschappen (the union of District Water Control Boards), and made 
publicly available under the GPL version 3 conditions at www.openries.nl. The RIES 
server and network infrastructure is hosted and managed by SURFnet.
1.2 A im  and scope of this report
Late last year, Het Waterschapshuis, the ICT-organization of the Dutch District Water 
Control Boards, decided to call for an evaluation and analysis of RIES-2008. Soon, it was 
clear that to be able to do that, a proper description of the RIES concept was also very much 
needed. Existing documentation was fragmented over many different manuscripts, often 
written for different purposes and with different intended readers. For an in-depth under­
standing of the intricacies the only available documentation was extensive and technically 
very detailed, written mainly for implementors.
The successive improvements to the RIES concept, as well as the ongoing development 
of RIES-2008, complicated a clear security analysis; changes were still been made, details 
were further filled in, etc. Moreover, in the existing documentation, design criteria are not 
always given and design choices not always discussed.
The aim of this report is given by its title: Description and Analysis of the R IE S  Internet  
Voting System .
By providing this report, we also hope to realize a secondary goal, namely to give the system 
a transparency that will make the workings of RIES much easier to understand for all 
parties involved: policy makers, scientists, election officials, implementors, and the general 
public interested in a proper understanding of the security of the RIES voting system. This 
document makes explicit what the assumptions in RIES are, what kind of restrictions apply, 
what level of security is achieved, etc., focussing on the security aspects, both technical and 
organizational /  procedural. Issues of availability, robustness and reliability however are 
only touched upon, not studied in detail.
This report focuses on the RIES concept in general and RIES-2008 in particular, where it 
should be realized that at the time of this writing the development of RIES-2008 was still 
not finalized. Some major differences between the various versions will be discussed. It is 
not an audit report, but a design study, as much as possible based on written documentation 
only.
It may be good for the reader to know that this report has been commissioned to LaQuSo2 
and EIPSI3 by the Waterschapshuis, but with the explicit provision of a completely inde­
pendent judgement. Several of the authors had some involvement in earlier RIES elections. 
The Radboud University Nijmegen (RUN) Digital Security group staged an independent 
vote counting during RIES-2004 and RIES-KOA as well as a website where voters could
2LaQuSo (www.laquso. com) is the Laboratory fo r  Quality Software, a research institute of the Eindhoven 
University of Technology (TU/e) and the Radboud University Nijmegen (RUN).
3EiPSI (www.win.tue.nl/~eipsi) is the Eindhoven Institu te fo r  the Protection o f System s and Informa­
tion , the TU/e information security research institute.
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verify that their vote was counted correctly, thereby making use of its own software but 
relying on the same input data (votes) as RIES (see also [6]). They came to exactly the 
same outcome for both elections. The RUN group also performed a small audit of the 
server used for RIES-2004. One of the Technische Universiteit Eindhoven (TU/e) authors 
acted as independent umpire during RIES-KOA, but, as it turned out, nobody called for 
his intervention.
The outline of this report is as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the possible requirements and 
properties that one may like to impose on Internet voting schemes. Chapter 3 describes 
and discusses the cryptographic characteristics of Internet voting schemes as can be found 
in the literature, and places RIES in this spectrum. Chapter 4 gives a detailed description 
of the RIES design (phases, components, cryptographic protocol, etc.). Chapter 5 follows 
with an elaborate security analysis. Overall conclusions are gives in Chapter 6.
2 Requirements for Internet voting systems
There are several formulations of requirements for (e-)voting systems. Here we shall take 
as starting point the eight requirements formulated in the report [11] from 2007 of the 
committee Korthals Altes, commissioned by the Dutch government. It lists the following 
eight requirements.
1. transparency The election process should be organized in such a way that the 
structure and organization is clear, so that everyone in principle can understand 
it. There must be no secrets in the election process: questions must be able to be 
answered, and the answers must be verifiable.
2. verifiability The election process should be objectively verifiable. The verification 
tools may differ, depending on the method of voting that is decided upon.
3. fairness /  integrity The election process should operate in a proper manner, and 
the results must not be capable of being influenced other than by the casting of lawful 
votes.
4. elig ibility to vote Only persons eligible to vote must be allowed to take part in the 
election.
5. equal suffrage /  unicity  Each voter, given the Dutch election system, must be 
allowed to cast only one vote in each election, which must be counted precisely once.
6. free suffrage /  vote freedom Every elector must be able to choose how to vote in 
complete freedom, free from influence.
7. secret suffrage /  vote secrecy It must be impossible to connect the identity of a 
person casting a vote to the vote cast. The process should be organized in such a way 
that it is impossible to make a voter indicate how he or she voted.
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8. accessibility Voters should be enabled as far as possible to participate directly in the 
election process. If this is impossible, there must be a way of taking part indirectly, 
i.e. by proxy.
This list is based on recommendations of the council of Europe [3]. There are many other 
sources, such as [1].
The precise meaning of these requirements is non-trivial and already involves interpreta­
tions. Some of the requirements seem relatively clear, like unicity: no voter should be able 
to vote more than one time. But does this also involve the requirement that votes cannot 
be duplicated? Or is non-duplication part of the integrity requirement?
The transparency requirement also seems obvious at first sight. But how far should it go? 
In electronic elections based on cryptographic techniques there are usually certain secret 
keys that should not be transparant, at least not during the actual operation of the election. 
Does the transparency requirement automatically mean that open source software must be 
used? Note that the formulation used above does not prescribe the absence of secrets in 
general, but only of secrets in the election process.
Apart from questions about the precise meaning of such requirements there are concerns 
about conflicts (or tensions) between them. Resolving these conflicts is precisely what 
makes (e-)voting such a challenging discipline. For instance, there is a tension between 
eligibility and vote secrecy: identification of voters is needed to ensure that only eligible 
voters participate, but there should be no way to connect voters’ identities to their votes 
in order to achieve vote secrecy. Similarly there is a tension between vote secrecy and 
verifiability: if all the individual steps can be logged in detail it is not so difficult to 
ensure correctness of the outcome. In general there is a tension between convenience (as in 
accessibility) and security (secrecy, integrity).
In this paper we do not wish to discuss these requirements at the highest level of generality. 
After all, we focus on one particular system only, namely RIES-2008. Therefore we can 
further explicate the requirements in the concrete context of RIES-2008, if needed.
The basis of RIES-2008 was developed in the context of regional District Water Control 
Board elections within the Netherlands. Voting for these boards is usually done via ordinary 
mail. Comparison with such mail elections has thus been leading during the design of RIES- 
2008: the system was required to be at least as ‘good’ or ‘secure’ as postal elections.
One of the main concerns in postal elections is vote freedom: voters can be coerced to cast 
a particular vote, either by immediate presence of the coercer, or by demanding (a copy 
of) the posted vote afterwards. A related concern is that voters may sell their vote. The 
RIES-2008 system does not (try to) address these concerns, simply because of the context 
of postal voting in which it was developed. Hence we can already draw the easy conclusion 
that RIES-2008 does not fully satisfy the requirements of [11]. A more refined analysis is 
needed.
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3 Cryptographic characteristics of Internet voting systems
3.1 General characteristics
Cryptography is an important provider of mechanisms for secrecy, integrity and authen­
tication. Therefore it is not surprising that cryptography is at the heart of the security 
design of many Internet voting systems. RIES is an example of this. In this chapter we 
give a brief overview of the major cryptographic characteristics of Internet voting systems 
(or, more generally, remote voting systems in which votes are cast through some public 
network).
A voting system typically centers around the following cryptographic protocols. The most 
visible protocols are the voting protocol, which is used by voters to cast their votes, and 
the tallying protocol, which is used to count the votes. A further major protocol is usually 
the set-up or initialization protocol (which also may involve registration of the voters).
We limit the discussion to voting protocols which do not require any interaction between 
the voters, hence each voter will be able to cast its vote independently, and possibly in 
parallel, to other voters. A useful cryptographic view of such an Internet voting system is 
obtained by focusing on the information stored by the voting servers upon completion of 
the voting protocol by each voter. We will refer to this information as the voted ballot. The 
voted ballots are used by the tallying protocol to determine the election result.
For voted ballots we consider three main characteristics:
•  voted ballot contains vote in the clear vs. encrypted form;
• vote or voted ballot is authenticated or not;
•  voted ballot is anonymous vs. non-anonymous.
We briefly comment on each of these characteristics in turn.
The most common case is that voted ballots contain the votes in encrypted form. To this 
end, public key encryption is usually employed, avoiding the need for voters to share a 
secret key with the voting servers (or tallying authorities). Decryption of the voted ballots 
will only be performed as part of the tallying protocol. One of the major reasons for the 
use of encryption is to block the computation of intermediate election results, as this is not 
allowed in many elections.
Also, voted ballots (or the votes therein contained) are usually authenticated, thereby 
showing that the voted ballot originates from a registered voter. (In some voting systems, 
however, voters may simply log on to the voting server and the voting server will basically 
store the (possibly encrypted) vote; this puts a lot of trust in the server.) The strength of 
authentication mechanisms employed varies a lot between voting systems. Authentication 
must be sufficiently strong to ensure that voters cannot cast more than one vote (and, of 
course, that only eligible voters can vote at all).
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Whether voted ballots are anonymous or non-anonymous is a major characteristic of an 
Internet voting system, which is strongly related to the way ballot secrecy is ensured by 
the system. In general, anonymous voted ballots are used to hide ‘who is voting’ and non- 
anonymous (identifiable) ballots are used to hide ‘what someone is voting for’. Normally, 
an anonymous voted ballot is required to be delivered through an anonymous channel to 
hide data such as the IP address of the voter’s computer.
3.2 Characteristics of the R IE S  protocol
In terms of the above cryptographic characteristics, RIES is a voting system in which 
voted ballots (i) contain the votes in the clear, (ii) are authenticated by means of a digital 
signature, and (iii) are required to be anonymous. The use of cryptography is in fact 
limited, as the anonymity of the voted ballots depends completely on trust (or, in any case, 
non-cryptographic procedures). In the context of the RIES protocol, cryptography is used 
solely for the authentication of the voted ballots.
3.3 Succinct cryptographic description of the R IE S  protocol
The type of authentication used in RIES is best understood in terms of so-called one-time 
digital signature schemes. These digital signature schemes are well-known in cryptography 
and were introduced in the mid 1970s, at the same time when public key cryptography 
was invented by Diffie and Hellman. See [21, Section 11.6] for a few example schemes and 
references.
A one-time digital signature schemes shares the same functionality as an ordinary digital 
signature scheme (such as schemes based on RSA or DSA), hence consists of the following 
three algorithms:
• Key generation. A probabilistic algorithm that on input of a security parameter k, 
generates a key pair (sk ,pk) consisting of a private key sk  and a public key pk.
•  S ignature generation. A (potentially) probabilistic algorithm that on input of a 
message m and a private key sk, outputs a signature s.
•  S ignature verification. A (usually) deterministic algorithm that on input of a 
message m , a public key p k , and a signature s , determines whether s is a valid 
signature on m with respect to public key pk.
The difference with an ordinary signature scheme is that the unforgeability of a one-time 
digital signature scheme is only guaranteed as long as no more than one signature is gen­
erated for a given key pair.
The restricted use of a key pair will provide no problems for application in voting systems, 
as each voter is supposed to cast a single vote only in the first place (voters will use newly 
generated key pairs in each election). The implication of the restricted use, however, is that
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one-time signature schemes can be implemented much more efficiently than ordinary sig­
nature schemes. For example, the Lamport one-time signature scheme (see [13], mentioned 
and attributed to Lamport already in [4, p.650]) can be instantiated using just a crypto­
graphic hash function such as SHA-1 or SHA-256 (without the need for number-theoretic 
one-way functions such as modular exponentiation).
To illustrate the basic idea of a one-time signature scheme we will describe the most basic 
one, namely a signature scheme which can be used to sign messages consisting of a single 
bit only. The scheme is defined in terms of a cryptographic hash function h, mapping bit 
strings of arbitrary length into bit strings of length 160, say. The algorithms are as follows:
• Key generation. Pick two k-bit strings x0,x 1 € {0,1}k uniform at random. The 
private key is sk := (xo,Xi) and the public key is pk := (y0, y 1) := (h(x0) ,h ( x 1)).
•  S ignature generation. Given a bit m € {0,1}, the signature is set to s := x m .
•  S ignature verification. Given a message m, a public key pk  =  (y0,y1), and a 
signature s, verify that h(s) =  ym holds.
This basic scheme can easily be extended to accommodate larger messages. Also, as is 
immediate from the construction, it is possible to compute the message m  from the signature 
s , with little effort only; hence, message recovery is achieved in a natural way. Furthermore, 
in practice one generates the private key pseudorandomly from a short seed, thus it is easy 
to limit the size of private keys. (The pseudorandom generator can be defined in terms of 
a cryptographic hash function as well.) In combination with Merkle’s authentication trees 
(introduced at the end of 1970s; see [22] and references therein), the size of public keys can 
be limited as well. In general, many trade-offs are possible between the speed of signature 
generation, verification, and the size of the keys; see, e.g., [2] for a rather general treatment.
In terms of a one-time digital signature scheme S , the RIES protocol can now be described 
succinctly as follows. Basically, a unique key pair is generated for each voter using the key 
generation algorithm of S . This is done before the election. During the election each voter 
will cast its vote by generating a one-time signature using scheme S , where the vote plays 
the role of the message. The signed vote (voted ballot) can be verified (using scheme S ) 
once its received by the voting server, or later, when all valid votes are added together. 
Note that anyone can count the votes as no encryption is used.
At this level of detail we can already make the following observations regarding the crypto­
graphic properties of the RIES protocol. First of all, although the voter should be the only 
party knowing the private key (as in ordinary signature schemes), the RIES protocol in fact 
generates the key pairs in a central place, from which the key pairs are then distributed to 
the voters. This gives rise to several major issues: (a) voters must trust that they are the 
only ones knowing their private keys, (b) in case private keys leak anyway, voters cannot 
dispute this fact, as anyone knowing a private key is equally powerful and may cast votes 
on behalf of the voters, (c) voters must trust that no one keeps track of who gets which 
key pair, as this would directly break ballot secrecy. Thus not only the generation of the 
key pairs, but also the delivery to the voters relies on trust in the parties involved (delivery
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can be thought of as done via an anonymous channel; the anonymous channel is, however, 
not done cryptographically but physically, using printers and envelopes).
Furthermore, the votes should actually be sent to the voting server using an anonymous 
channel, as the votes are cast in the clear. An anonymous channel, however, is a very 
complicated and expensive cryptographic primitive. Therefore, the RIES protocol simply 
assumes that the voting server can be trusted not to record the IP addresses from which the 
voters submit their votes (via an SSL connection). The voting server must also be trusted 
not to compute intermediate election results, based on the votes received so far.
The use of cryptography is thus rather limited in the RIES protocol. Moreover, as the 
key pairs are generated in a pseudorandom way from a master key, the effectiveness of the 
one-time signature scheme is reduced, as knowledge of the master key allows one to cast 
votes on behalf of anyone.
Consequently, the security of the RIES system will mainly depend on the use of admin­
istrative procedures and trust in these procedures. Any security requirement beyond the 
scope of the RIES cryptographic protocol should be handled by other measures.
4 Description of the RIES design
This chapter gives a detailed description of the design of RIES-2008, based on the available 
documentation. For easy referring we start with listing the data structures that are central 
to the RIES design. Then we give a description of all that happens during the different 
phases of a RIES election, the main components and architecture are described, and the 
RIES cryptographic protocol which is at the heart of the security design is studied in detail.
4.1 D ata  structures
This section describes the data structures relevant for our detailed description of RIES-2008, 
such as identifiers, cryptographic keys, codes derived by cryptographic means, paper forms 
and digital files. Each data structure has an attribute to denote its level of confidentiality: 
“public” if anyone is allowed to access it; “voter” if only one specific voter should have 
access, or “system” if no persons at all, or at most only RIES officials, may have access. 
Data structures that contain values that are specific for a voter are denoted by a subscript
i, data structures related to replacement and test votes are denoted by a subscript i', while 
a subscript j  denotes an individual candidate.
The following cryptographic mechanisms are used:
• DES, single DES encryption, used in DESmac and as the block cipher inside MDC-2,
• 3DES, double key triple DES encryption, used in DESmac, to encrypt sensitive system 
files, and for key derivation,
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• DESmac, Message Authentication Code based on DES or 3DES, used for authentication 
of voters and ballots (when applied to one 8-byte block of data DESmac is just DES- 
ECB encryption),
•  MDC-2, Modification Detection Code MDC-2, a hash function based on 3DES, used for 
one-way hashing to anonymize sensitive data in order to enable public verification,
•  RSA, RSA public key encryption, used for wrapping / unwrapping of 3DES keys and 
for certification of public keys,
• SHA-1, SHA-1 hash algorithm, used to generate public commitment values for public 
file contents.
The MAC of message m under key k will be denoted by DESmac(k,m). String concatenation 
will be denoted by ||.
4.1.1 Identifiers
Table 1 lists identifiers that are not derived by cryptographic means.
name status size description
E1ID public 2 bytes Election Identifier
ElCd public Election code, human-friendly form of E1ID
BalBxID public 4 bytes Ballot box identifier, expanded version of E1ID
Vn; voter,
system
Voter name and address
VnlDi voter,
system
5 bytes Voter Identifier (simple encoding of the Dutch So­
cial Security Number (BSN) or another identi­
fier (A-number) from the citizen administration 
(GBA))
VrID ? voter,
system
5 bytes Replacement Package Identifier, similar format as 
VnlDj
VtID i> system 5 bytes Test Package Identifier, similar format as VnlDi
ParGp public 1 byte Participation Group (to allow for voter groups, in 
RIES-2008 this is one fixed value)
ExtParGp public 2 characters Extended Participation Group, human-friendly 
version of ParGp
AbelPIj voter,
system
8 bytes Abuse Elimination Personal Information (per 
voter), this sometimes refers to the last two dig­
its of the voter’s year of birth, and sometimes to 
an 8-byte value derived from it
Cmi public 6 bytes Candidate Identifier
Table 1: Identifiers.
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4.1.2 C ryptographic Keys
Tables 2 and 3 list symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic keys. Also codes that are 
essentially keys in a different representation are listed here.
The asymmetric key pairs are RSA key pairs with a modulus size of at least 2048 bits [17]. 
Public keys are authenticated in X.509 certificates. The Certification Authority conforms 
to the requirements of the Dutch Government PK I4. SSL key pairs, used for remote access 
to the Portal (both by voters and RIES operators), are not mentioned in this section, as 
they are not directly used in the RIES core protocol. These SSL key pairs are managed by 
SURFnet, under responsibility of the Waterschapshuis.
name status key length description
Kgenvoterkey system 112 bits 3DES key for generating voter keys Kp^
KPi voter 56 bits Voter key, DES key, generated at initializa­
tion and distributed to the voter in the elec­
tion package; to obtain Kp^  the 8-byte mes­
sage “VnlDj 11E1ID1 ParGp” is encrypted using 
3DES with the key Kgenvoterkey, note that 
replacement and test values VrIDj/, VtlDj/ are 
treated similarly in the generation of replace­
ment and test voter keys
VPIDU ,
VPID2,i
voter,
system
56 bits Voting code, two halves of Kpj, encoded to 16 
characters from an alphabet of size 34 by a 
simple alphanumeric encoding scheme called 
34AN (to make them human-friendly as the 
voters have to enter these values on screen, the 
splitting into two halves seems not essential)
OCRj voter,
system
Machine readable encoding of the 3DES en­
cryption of the message “KpJlAbelPIj” by the 
key Kkpocr, used to transform postal into 
electronic vote
Kkpocr,
Kocrkp
system 112 bits 3DES key, used as Kkpocr for encryption of Kp^  
into OCRi, and as Kocrkp for decryption
KclO system 112 bits Printer 3DES session key, used for encryption 
and decryption of WV-STUF-C10.xml
Kbbs_0 system 112 bits 3DES key for generating receipts
KabelPi system 112 bits 3DES session key for encrypting and decrypt­
ing the Abel-part. of OCR^
Kpretal system 112 bits 3DES session key for encrypting and decrypt­
ing pre-tally result reports
Table 2: Symmetric keys.
4PKI Overheid, see www.pkioverheid.nl.
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name status key length description
PKpsbclO,
SKpsbclO
public,
system
1024 bits Printer public RSA key pair, used for wrap­
ping resp. unwrapping KclO, the private key 
is to be destroyed at least 24 hours before 
starting the election
PKpsbttp,
SKpsbttp
public,
system
1024 bits TTP public RSA key pair, used to certify the 
origin of PKpsbclO
PKnotpretal,
SKnotpretal
public,
system
1024 bits Notary public RSA key pair, used for wrap­
ping resp. unwrapping Kpretal
PKnotttp,
PKnotttp
public,
system
1024 bits TTP public RSA key pair, used to certify the 
origin of PKnotpretal
Table 3: Asymmetric key pairs.
4.1.3 Cryptographically  derived codes
Table 4 lists codes that are derived by cryptographic means but that are not keys themselves.
name status size description
RnPIDi public 8 bytes Reference pseudo voter identity, as computed at 
initialization and stored in the pre-election table, 
RnPIDj =  MDC-2(VnPIDj)
RnCxjj public 8 bytes Reference potential vote per voter and per candi­
date, stored in the pre-election table, RnCxjj = 
MDC-2(VnCxjj), for not only the actual VnCxjj but 
for each possible values of it
RnpotVote^ public All potential votes per voter, i.e. for given i all possible 
RnCxjj
ReSPIDi voter,
system
8 bytes Alternative reference pseudo voter identity as com­
puted at initialization and stored in the status track­
ing file, the MDC-2 of the DESmac of the padded mes­
sage “E1ID1 ExtParGp” with the key Kp^
VnPIDj voter 8 bytes Pseudo voter identity, as computed by the voter as 
the DESmac with the key Kp^  of the padded message 
“BalBxID”)
continues on next page
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name status size description
VnCxjj voter 8 bytes Actual vote, as computed by the voter as the 
DESmac with the key Kp^  of a message based on 
Cmj (for the voter’s choice of the candidate) and 
AbelPIj
V ir tu a lB a llo tj voter,
system
16 bytes Virtual Ballot, consisting of VnPIDi and VnCXjj
RnRecVotej public 16 bytes Reference value of a recorded vote, consisting of 
the concatenation of the MDC-2’s of VnPIDi and 
VnCxjj-
VotRecConjj- system 8 bytes Voter Receipt Confirmation, computed by the 
ballot box server as the DESmac of the message 
“VnPIDi VnCxij” with the key Kbbs_0
VotRecConSvrjj- system 4 bytes Receipt for the umpire, the upper 4 bytes of 
VotRecCorijj-
VotRecConCntjj- voter 4 bytes Receipt for the voter, the lower 4 bytes of 
VotRecCorijj-
VotValVal voter 20 bytes The receipt string sent back to the voter, equal 
to VnPIDj VnCxjj- VotRecConCntjj-
Table 4: Cryptographically derived codes
4.1.4 Paper forms
Table 5 lists paper forms and election packages.
name status description
Postal Ballot Form voter On the ballot form OCR^  is shown in machine readable 
form, containing in encrypted form the voter key Kp^  
(equivalent to voting code VPIDi^, VPIÜ2 ,i) and AbelPIj
Voting Card voter On the voting card the voting code (VPIDi^, VPID2 ,i, 
equivalent to the voter key KpJ and the E1ID are shown 
in human readable form
continues on next page
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name status description
ElPac voter Election Package, containing the Postal Ballot Form and Voting 
Card for voter VnlDi in a closed envelope, Vn^  is printed on the 
outside of the envelope
RepElPac voter Replacement Election Package, containing a Postal Ballot Form 
and Voting Card for replacement voter VrIDj/ in a closed envelope, 
VrIDj/ is printed on the outside of the envelope
TstElPac system Test Election Package, containing a Postal Ballot Form and Voting 
Card for test voter VtlDj/ in a closed envelope, VtlDj/ is printed 
on the outside of the envelope
Table 5: Paper forms.
4.1.5 Files
Table 6 lists all files and their record structure. All public files are published on a website, 
and their integrity is protected by publishing the SHA-1 hash value in a newspaper.
name status description
WV-STUF-B10.xml system Management data about an election
WV-STUF-C10.xml system Input for the printer, contains per voter VnlDi, Vn^ , 
VPIDi^, VPID2,i, the file is encrypted using 3DES with a 
fresh random key, this 3DES-key is encrypted using RSA 
with PKpsbclO, replacement and test packages data are 
present in the same file; this extremely sensitive file (with 
all its copies) is to be destroyed at least 24 hours before 
starting the election
WV-STUF-K10.xml system Voter Registry, contains per voter VnIDj, Vrij and the day 
of birth from which AbelPI^ can be derived, this file is 
privacy sensitive
WV-STUF-K11 .xml system Similar to WV-STUF-K10.xml, containing records for both 
replacement voters and test voters
WV-STUF-K30.xml system File that is being used to transfer the information from 
scanned postal ballots (a.o. OCR^ , AbelPI^, and the candi­
date number) to RIPOCS who converts this information 
into technical votes
continues on next page
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n a m e status description
WV-STUF-K50.xml public Party and candidate registry contains one ’blanco’ can­
didate
WV-STUF-HOO.xml system The data files WV-STUF-B10.xml, WV-STUF-C10.xml, 
WV-STUF-K10.xml, WV-STUF-K30.xml and 
WV-STUF-K50. xml are always accompanied by a 
WV-STUF-HOO. xml file that contains a hash value of the 
data file, in order to enable validating the integrity of 
the data file
Status tracking file system Contains status values, indexed by ReSPIDj
Reference table public Contains all possible votes in the form RnpotVote^, will 
be published on the web before the election starts; its 
SHA-1 hash value will be published in a newspaper
Virtual Ballot Box system Contains all actual votes in the form VnPIDj||VnCxjj
IRecVote file public Internet Received Votes, published on the web after the 
election is closed, its SHA-1 hash value will be published 
in a newspaper
PRecVote file system Postal Received Votes
RecVote file public Merge of IRecVote and PRecVote, published on the web 
after the election is closed, its SHA-1 hash value will be 
published in a newspaper
RecPost.Bal file system Postal Ballots
RepElPac File public Replacement Election Package file, contains VrIDj/’s of 
issued replacement packages, published on the web after 
the election is closed, its SHA-1 hash value will be pub­
lished in a newspaper
TstElPac File system Test Election Package file, contains VtIDj/’s
Mutations File public Mutations to reference file due to issuing replacement 
packages, published on the web after the election is closed, 
its SHA-1 hash value will be published in a newspaper
Table 6: Files.
4.2 Phases
Before we will look at the specific phases in RIES-2008, we start by defining a list of actors 
inside the system. Sometimes these actors are real persons, sometimes they are systems. 
For background see [19].
U v W  From the current documentation it is not really clear who is actually responsible 
for which part of the elections. Basically each District Water Control Board is respon­
sible for its own election. However some tasks have been delegated to this Unie van
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Waterschappen, for instance by signing a treaty that describes how the different Dis­
trict Water Control Boards will work together on this project. Furthermore, the UvW 
has on its turn delegated tasks to HWH. Since this paper is more about the technical 
issues of the RIES protocol we will not further address the issue of responsibilities.
D W C B  The Netherlands consists of 26 District Water Control Boards (DWCBs). Each 
authority is responsible for its own election. This means that they have to check all 
the information with respect to the list of people entitled to vote, but also that they 
have to have their own helpdesk in order to administrate and distribute replacement 
forms.
H W H  Het Waterschapshuis is a special ICT department that works for all these 26 
DWCBs. Its tasks are both technical (e.g. developing software and infrastructure 
for the election) and organizational (e.g. making sure that all DWCBs know how to 
deliver their data). They control the overall process of the elections.
Bestandendienst An outsourced service, which is taking care of all the files that have to 
do with the people entitled to vote. They seem to cooperate only directly with HWH 
and therefore we will consider them as part of HWH.
R IP O C S  This is the isolated server for sensitive operations. For instance, it is used for 
generating the file that links voter keys to persons.
R O C M IS  This is the so-called init and cloning server.
P O R T A L  This is not a person but a system. The system can be seen as a sort of workflow 
manager. It facilitates services in such a way that parties like HWH and DWCB can 
actually do the things they have to do. Its tasks include integration of all received 
votes, prepare publications and offer them to HWH and many other tasks.
PSB  Printing service bureau; the company that takes care of printing and mailing the 
ballot forms.
D P S B  Desktop publishing service that basically supports PSB. Its task is mainly to 
make sure that specific stuff like all the appropriate logos for each DWCB is correct. 
Because their task is pretty small, we will see them as part of PSB.
V P S B  The bureau that takes care of interpreting the votes that were cast by mail. If 
possible this is done by OCR techniques, but if needed this will include some manual 
input of ballot forms.
SU R F ne t This is basically the Dutch service provider for institutes of higher education. 
In RIES-2008 its task is mainly to support the technical infrastructure of both the 
PORTAL as well as the VotWin.
U M P IR E  The umpire is a trusted third party that will look into all the complaints 
of voters after the election. He has specific technical possibilities to check whether 
complaints are valid or not.
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V O T E R  An individual voter. Besides his usual role of casting a vote, the voter also has 
the ability to check his vote after the final tally process. If sufficiently many voters 
use this right, fraud should become detectable.
V o tW in  The Voting Window server. The application that takes care of actually receiving 
the Internet votes.
N O T A R Y  The notary is used to act as a safe and trusted place for storing secret infor­
mation that shouldn’t be destroyed.
As with most electronic voting systems also RIES-2008 can be divided into three stages. 
The first stage is the so-called initialization phase, which takes care of everything that needs 
to be done before the actual elections start. The second stage is the time slot in which the 
actual voting takes place. The third and last stage is the so-called tallying phase. This 
phase includes all steps that are needed in order to derive the outcome of the election in 
such a way that the result is correct and verifiable.
4.2.1 In it ia liza tion  — overview
This stage is also known as the preparation stage. It starts as soon as it is decided that 
an election will take place and end at the moment that the voting window is opened. The 
main tasks that need to be done are
• Establish an official election authority with an appropriate mandate.
•  Determine the rules that entitle people to vote.
•  Establish a list of people entitled to vote.
•  Establish a list of all the candidates and their associated parties.
•  Generate all essential cryptographic keys.
• Generate the personalized codes for each entitled voter and include them in the so- 
called pre-election reference tables. In addition, include some anonymous codes as 
well that can be used later on as so-called replacement codes.
• Publish the reference table together with its hash to make sure that each modification 
of this table can be detected.
• Generate the personalized information needed to print all ballot forms.
• Send all the printed forms to the voters.
Note that some of these actions have clear time (and order) constraints, while others can 
de done in parallel, independently. These constraints will become clear in the next section.
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Figure 1: Initialization phase, part 1. Recall that B10 contains administrative information, 
K10 contains the list of voters and K50 the list of candidates.
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Initialization (part 2)
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Figure 2: Initialization phase, part 2. Recall that K11 contains the replacement voters and 
test voters.
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4.2.2 In it ia liza tion  — in  detail
In Figures 1 and 2 the important tasks in this phase are shown. Note that for some actions 
the exact time that they are performed compared to actions by other actors is not always 
relevant. However, the arrows that connect two actors always act as a time for synchro­
nization. Furthermore, for reasons of simplicity, we do not include the WV-STUF-H00. xml 
file all the time. Basically, every time a file is transported from one system to another, the 
contents of the file are checked by computing a hash of the file and comparing it with the 
appropriate value that is sent in WV-STUF-H00.xml.
At the top of the MSC in Figure 1 we see that RIPOCS gets crypto hardware from ROCMIS. 
Although it is depicted as a message, it is not really a message that is transported over some 
channel. Before this preparation phase, in an off-line situation ROCMIS has been used to 
generate the device master key KM and ‘copy’ it onto different instances of the hardware 
crypto by cloning the device. See [16] for more details. Note that this preparation ends by 
setting the crypto cards in a state that they cannot be cloned anymore afterwards. One of 
these instances is the RIPOCS system. Or actually, RIPOCS is not just one machine but 
there are always three of them in order to detect possible mistakes. Actions by RIPOCS 
are only accepted if at least two of these three systems give the same result. However, from 
a conceptual point of view, RIPOCS is just one entity and hence we pretend as if it really 
is only one machine.
And now that RIPOCS has its master key KM, RIPOCS can generate the key Kgenvoterkey 
which will be used later on to generate the specific voter keys. Note that this cannot be done 
at the time that the same hardware is still in ROCMIS, because although the Kgenvoterkey 
cannot be exported from the card, it could be abused by ROCMIS. Furthermore, PSB 
creates its pair of public key PKpsbc10 and private key SKpsbc10 on its special crypto 
import pc [17]. It obtains a certificate on its public PKpsbc10 from a certification authority. 
After that the certificate containing the public key PKpsbc10 is sent to HWH. On its turn 
HWH installs PKpsbc10 and the certificate on PORTAL, from which it is transported to 
RIPOCS.
Also quite at the top of the MSC we see that the DWCB sends some administrative in­
formation to the HWH like when the election exactly starts, when it stops, its short name 
etc. This is done by each of the 26 DWCBs. All this information is combined into one 
WV-STUF-B10. xml file by the HWH which is sent to PORTAL to define all the elections on 
the PORTAL.
A bit lower we see that HWH receives information from the Dutch GBA (citizen admin­
istration) containing the name and address information of all the people entitled to vote. 
Technically this is not done by HWH, but by Bestandendienst. Based upon these files and 
the rules that explain who is entitled to vote in a specific election, the file WV-STUF-K10.xml 
is created. Basically this file contains a list of all the voters, identified by a unique ID which 
is known in the system as VnID^. Typically the Dutch BSN (comparable to the social secu­
rity number in the US) or the so-called A-number (used in the GBA) is used here. However, 
it can be any unique number. See [19]. W ithin this list of voters, for each voter a list is 
created for which ballot boxes this voter is entitled to vote. Although there is only one
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election, each election can consist of different ballot boxes. This WV-STUF-K10.xml is sent 
to the PORTAL, which sends it in its turn to the corresponding DWCB. It is the task of 
the DWCB to check whether this list is correct.
Besides checking the WV-STUF-K10.xml, the DWCB is also responsible for generating its 
WV-STUF-K50.xml. This is the file that contains all the parties and their associated candi­
dates. In particular this file determines exactly how the names will show up on the printed 
ballot form, the ballot form on the screen, the result of the election, etc. Hence it is clear 
that it is very important to check that the names are written correctly. This is exactly 
why we see first that DWCB generates this file, sends it to PORTAL, which sends it back 
to DWCB, who checks it and finally indicates to PORTAL that it is OK. Although this 
may seem strange in the MSC, this is only because inside this MSC we do not distinguish 
between the different roles inside the DWCB. One role has responsibility for generating the 
file, another role later on has responsibility for checking the file.
When WV-STUF-K50.xml is approved, it will be sent to the VotWin, so it can be used to 
create the screens with all the candidates. This is the last line of Figure 1.
We now continue with what we see in Figure 2. This MSC starts when WV-STUF-K10.xml 
and WV-STUF-K50.xml are sent to RIPOCS. Although, technically, ‘are sent’ is not what 
happens. Because of security reasons it is not possible to connect to RIPOCS. Only 
RIPOCS itself is able to connect to PORTAL and look at a specific place to see whether 
the appropriate files are available and waiting to be copied to RIPOCS itself.
Based upon the statistics of WV-STUF-K10.xml RIPOCS decides how many test forms and 
how many replacement forms need to be created. These special ballots are described in the 
file WV-STUF-K11.xml, which looks a lot like WV-STUF-K10.xml, but doesn’t contain real 
names, see also Section 4.2.6. Furthermore, these special voters are identified by an ID 
called VrID^ and not by VnID,. These VrID^s can be chosen freely as long as they start 
with a 9 for replacement ballots and 99 for test ballots and are unique within the list of all 
VnID,s and VrID,/s together. After WV-STUF-K11.xml is created, RIPOCS uses its master 
key Kgenvoterkey to generate voter keys Kp, for each voter listed in WV-STUF-K10.xml and 
WV-STUF-K11 .xml. To be more precise,
Kp, =  3DES(Kgenvoterkey, (VnIDi||ElID||ParGp))
for real voters in WV-STUF-K10.xml. For the replacement and test voters in WV-STUF-K11 .xml, 
the computation is basically the same but VnID, is replaced by VrID,/. Note that after Kp, is 
calculated in the rest of the process of generating the reference table there is no distinction 
between reference values for real voters or for replacement or test voters. The difference 
can only be seen by looking at the status bits in the reference table. Now RIPOCS is 
going to create WV-STUF-C10.xml. This is a very important file since it contains a lot of 
confidential information. For each voter the following information is linked:
• VnID, (or VrID,/ ),
• Name,
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• Address,
• Day of birth,
• Kp,, split in two parts VPID^ and VPID^ and encoded in AN34,
• OCR,.
If someone gets hold of this file he will in principle be able to vote on behalf of each 
registered voter. Furthermore, after the election he will be able to determine who voted for 
which candidate.
Therefore this WV-STUF-C10.xml is encrypted with the randomly generated 3DES CCA 
encipher key Kc10, which is generated as exportable key in crypto hardware and wrapped 
within the public key PKpsbc10 to make sure tha t only PSB is able to decrypt the file. In 
particular it is not possible to use this Kc10 to decrypt WV-STUF-C10.xml on RIPOCS.
Furthermore, these voter keys are used by RIPOCS to compute three im portant values:
• ReSPID, =  MDC-2(DESmac(Kp,, (ElID||ExtParGp))), the reference pseudo voter identity 
which is used for the status in VotWin.
• VnPID, =  DESmac(Kpj, f  (BalBxID)), the voter’s pseudo identity,
• VnCx^j =  DESmac(Kpj,f (AbelPI,, Cmj)), the candidate’s identity for this voter.
Here f  is a simple padding function. The last two items are in their turn  used to compute 
the
• RnPID, =  MDC-2(VnPIDj),
•  RnCx^j =  MDC^VnCxjj ).
These last two hashed values are used to build the reference table. Basically, the reference 
table is a table that contains all possible valid votes, including the votes that could be cast 
by a replacement or test voter.
By publishing the reference table before the election, it can be assured that votes are 
counted for the proper candidate. Or in other words, by publishing the reference tables 
before the elections, it can be made clear tha t the link between cryptographic numbers and 
candidates are fixed before the elections. Technically, the reference table consists of two 
parts. One part, RDT.zip, contains all the links between candidates and numbers for each 
voter. The other part, RDS.zip, contains status bits, indicating whether a certain ballot is 
used for test, as a replacement or for a normal voter. RDT.zip can never be modified, but 
RDS.zip can be modified during the election. This will be indicated later on.
At the end of all this work by RIPOCS, all files are copied to PORTAL again by RIPOCS.
The file WV-STUF-K11 .xml stays at PORTAL. It is used later by the helpdesk. The ReSPID,s
are sent to VotWin, because they are needed to keep track of the progress of voting by the
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voters in the status table. The reference table is published by PORTAL, secured by hashes 
tha t are published in media so that they cannot be changed anymore.
The encrypted WV-STUF-C10.xml and unencrypted WV-STUF-K50.xml are sent to PSB. 
They will decrypt the file and use it to generate the ballot forms together with the envelopes 
and the addresses. The ballots for regular voters are distributed by mail. The replacement 
ballots are presumably delivered to the corresponding DWCB, since it is the helpdesk of 
each DWCB that has to use them. Finally, the WV-STUF-C10.xml file must be destroyed.
When all this is done the election can be started. Technically, the election could have been 
started automatically using the information in the WV-STUF-B10.xml file, but it has been 
decided tha t HWH will create an official start through a PORTAL application order to 
start the elections.
4 .2 .3  V ote  co llectio n  — overv iew
The main tasks during this stage are:
• Opening and closing of the ballot box.
• Receiving and storing votes by Internet and mail.
• Operate the helpdesk: deal appropriately with people claiming tha t they didn’t re­
ceive their ballot form.
• Generate reports of all actions taken.
• Publish the modified reference table together with its hash to protect it against further 
modification.
4 .2 .4  V ote  co llectio n  — in detail: C astin g  a v o te  by In tern et
In Figure 3 we show the flow of information tha t describes a vote being cast by Internet. 
The MSC starts with two basic items. First the voter Vn, should have received his ballot 
and second the election must have been started by PORTAL.
Now Vn, connects to the website, which is automatically set up as an SSL connection. 
Because the document [18] is not really up to date at this moment, we don’t know exactly 
which screens are sent. However, by private communication we were told tha t some screens 
are sent where the voter does nothing besides reading the information and clicking ‘next’. 
Therefore these screens are combined in the diagram with the first screen tha t really needs 
user input.
Screen A000 asks the voter to enter the election code ElCd, which he can find on his 
ballot. This ElCd is nothing but the ElID, but written in AN34 and with input validation 
characters added. The JavaScript program transforms ElCd into ElID and sends it to 
VotWin. Now VotWin checks whether this is a valid election id and if so, it returns screen 
A010 which is personalized based upon the indicated election.
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Figure 3: Vote collection if voted by Internet
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Now the voter has to enter his so-called VPID1;,, VPID2,, and AbelPI,. The first two values 
are written on the ballot and are nothing but the voters personal key Kp,, the last value 
is something tha t he should know. It is used to reduce the possible abuse of ballot forms. 
Currently this field is nothing but the last two digits of the voter's year of birth, which is 
obviously not a very strong code. It can be guessed with a reasonable chance of success. 
Both the VPID1;, and VPID2,, contain checksums and are checked locally by the client PC 
via JavaScript. If correct, they are used to compute ReSPID,. At the end of this stage 
this ReSPID, is sent to the server, together with (again) the ElID. Note in particular that 
VPID1;, and VPID2,, are not sent over the Internet.
When the VotWin receives the ElID and the ReSPID,, the system checks whether this is a 
valid combination. This is most likely done using the table ‘status’, which has a primary key 
consisting of these two values. Furthermore, this same table contains a field ‘status’ that 
indicates whether a voter has already or has not yet voted for a certain election. In case 
he hasn’t voted the server will now present the voter with screen A020 tha t shows all the 
parties competing in this election, including an option for a blank vote. The voter simply 
chooses one and the server now presents screen A025, a list with all the candidates within 
this party. Although this sounds like a straightforward way to do it, there is something 
special tha t needs to be mentioned here. If the information that the server sends to the 
voter only contains the candidates of the party chosen by him, by looking at the length of 
this encrypted package, it could be possible to make an educated guess about his favorite 
party. Information leakages is prevented by sending all parties and candidates in one large 
message and using JavaScript on the client to make sure tha t the voter sees the appropriate 
screens A020 and A025. After selecting the candidate, screen A030 is presented which shows 
only the candidate that has been chosen previously. This screen also contains the final vote 
button.
Once the voter presses this button the JavaScript engine starts to compute the so-called 
technical vote. In particular this means that by using his secret Kp,, the values VnPID, 
and VnCx,j are computed. The first indicates the pseudo identity of the voter, the second 
indicates the pseudo identity of the candidate chosen by the voter. Note that we have 
seen these values before: RIPOCS has computed them as a necessary intermediate step to 
compute all hash values RnPID,s and RnCx,js, tha t were published in the reference table. 
Now tha t this technical vote is computed, it is sent to VotWin together with the voter’s 
ReSPID,. Note tha t all these messages between Vn, and VotWin are done via SSL and 
hence encrypted, furthermore this SSL session takes care of communication integrity and 
server authentication: the voter can check by clicking on the browser ‘padlock’ tha t he is 
communicating with a proper RIES server.
The server VotWin is going to store this technical vote. However, before it actually stores 
the vote it seems tha t it checks the ReSPID, to be sure tha t the vote corresponds to one 
from a legitimate voter. The technical vote itself is not checked. Now assume that the 
ReSPID, is valid. This technical vote is stored in two different ways. As was the case with 
the previous version RIES-KOA, the technical vote is appended to a simple text file on 
the server, typically in a file tha t used to be called ‘ssXvotes.txt’ where the X denotes the 
number of the server being used. However, in addition to this RIES-2008 also stores the
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vote in a MySQL database referred to as ‘Stembus’. And to be more precise, the server 
tries to insert the vote not only into one database, but in a cluster of databases, all on 
different physical locations. This is for safety reasons if something goes wrong with one of 
the databases. Only if the server receives the message tha t the insert has succeeded from 
two different databases, the server is going to mark this vote as being cast. In tha t situation, 
the server is going to update the status of the user who sent the vote (using the ReSPID, 
value). Furthermore it is going to compute a receipt tha t the voter can use to prove that he 
voted. This receipt is actually only half of the value that the server computes. Technically, 
the VotWin computes VotRecCon,j =  DESmac(Kbbs_0, VnPID,||VnCx,j). The key Kbbs_0 is 
stored in the crypto hardware inside the server. This VotRecCon,j is an eight byte value, 
which is stored in the database, in the ‘status’ field of the ‘status’ table. Note that this table 
only contains one row for each ReSPID, and therefore if a voter decides to vote twice or more, 
only the last VotRecCon,j will be stored in the database. However, this VotRecCon^j is 
split in two four byte values, such tha t VotRecCon^j =  VotRecConSvr,j||VotRecConCnt,j. 
And only the last four bytes VotRecConCnt,j are sent to the voter. After the election, the 
voter can use this value if his vote doesn’t show up in the tally results. In order to do that 
he needs to go to the so-called UMPIRE, who is able to check whether the four bytes that 
the voter has are in fact part of a valid confirmation receipt or not. See Section 4.2.10 for 
more information about this process.
In the diagram we see that besides this receipt confirmation value, also the screens A050 and 
A060 are sent as one message. Screen A050 shows to the voter wether the vote was received 
or not. Furthermore, it contains a button tha t needs to be pressed in order to actually see 
the important values VotRecConCnt,j and the technical vote as presented on screen A060. 
The values are important because they are needed to check one’s vote in the final tally 
result. And they are also important because if someone gets to know the technical vote of a 
voter, he doesn’t need any cryptographic key anymore to discover on which candidate the 
voter voted. This switch between pages is done via JavaScript. The value VotRecConCnt,j 
is computed, stored and sent to the client by VotWin. In particular it is possible to ask 
the server to resend the receipt value in a later stage, based upon the voter’s ReSPID,. This 
will be done in case a voter repeats his voting process after the successful casting of his 
vote in an earlier stage. However, it is not possible to retrieve the technical vote from the 
server by sending the ReSPID,. This would be an easy way for people to find out to which 
candidate a voter has cast his vote. That is the reason the browser uses JavaScript to keep 
the technical vote in memory. Note that via private communication we heard that there 
were ideas to present the VotRecConCnt,j and the technical vote to the voter by means of a 
.pdf file, however, since this file is likely to be generated on the server, this would introduce 
a method for sending out technical votes by the server and that is something tha t should 
be prevented, so we advise against this idea.
The final screen A100 is simply a message in which the voter is being thanked for casting 
his vote.
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Figure 4: Vote collection if voted by mail
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4 .2 .5  V ote  co llectio n  — in detail: C astin g  a v o te  by m ail
Figure 4 describes the second way of voting: sending the ballot forms by regular mail. 
Obviously, the main prerequisite is tha t voter Vn, has received his ballot form. Note that 
it is not needed that the election is officially started as with voting by Internet. The voter 
just needs to make sure tha t he sends his ballot in time; he can’t send it too early.
Filling out the form requires three steps. First he has to write down the last two digits of 
his year of birth. This will result in the so-called AbelPI, information. Furthermore, he 
has to mark his favorite group, followed by the candidate number within tha t group. In 
case a voter only selects a group and no candidate, the first candidate of that group will 
receive the vote. The ballot forms do not show the names of the individual candidates on 
the ballot form. They only show generic names like ‘Candidate 12’. This is done to allow 
for an A4 size postal ballot, in spite of the fact tha t the voter can choose out of over thirty 
groups, each with a maximum of fifteen candidates. To figure out who is ‘Candidate 12’ 
a separate list with the names and numbers is provided. This seems like a system tha t is 
likely to introduce mistakes.
The ballots are received by VPSB. They expect thousands of forms everyday and hence 
they will not wait till the election is closed, but will use batch processing to handle the 
ballots. They start by scanning the forms. The forms contain special OCR lines that 
somehow represent the pseudo identity of the voter. More precisely the OCR lines contain 
the Kp,, but only encrypted by the 3DES key Kkpocr. In particular the decrypt version 
of this key Kocrkp is needed to actually compute Kp, itself. And even then one would 
probably need Kgenvoterkey as well to compute personal information like VnID,, which 
is typically the BSN. These lines are for instance used to check whether the voter has 
made copies of his ballot and submits it more than once. Furthermore, these lines are also 
used to help VPSB with recognizing the handwritten AbelPI, on the ballot forms. Since 
it is difficult for character recognition software to recognize a text of only two characters, 
VPSB gets some help from the system. Using the so-called Abel-PI-Black-box, a module 
tha t contains a smartcard with the key KabelPi on it, the correct AbelPI, is computed 
for each postal vote tha t was received by VPSB. If the handwritten characters cannot be 
identified unambiguously, this real AbelPI, will be used for determining what was written. 
For instance if the normal software cannot decide whether a 1 or 7 is written by the voter, 
but in the real AbelPI, a 7 is written on the same place, then the software will decide that 
a 7 was probably written. Obviously it would have been easier to give VPSB a list of all 
AbelPI,s, but using this method with Abel-PI-Black-box it is enforced tha t VPSB only 
gets to know the AbelPI, of ballots tha t have been received. In addition, note that VPSB 
only transforms the postal ballots into digital information and never marks votes as invalid, 
even though they can see tha t the written AbelPI, was wrong. W hether a vote is valid or 
not will be determined later during the tally process. See [25] for more details.
If a ballot cannot be handled automatically, a long chain of responsible persons will look 
at it, starting at VPSB, but eventually moving to the corresponding DWCB. And as soon 
as a DWCB is involved the ballot is part of the so-called ‘twijfelstroom’.
W ith the information form a batch of scanned ballot forms a file WV-STUF-K30. xml is
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created by VPSB. Each (complete) ballot gets transformed into a record containing the 
ballot box number, the OCR lines, the AbelPI, information, the selected party and the 
selected candidate and a reference to the stored image of the scan. Besides these records, 
each WV-STUF-K30. xml batch file also contains statistics about how many ballots are trans­
formed in this batch and also for accumulated for all batches so far. VPSB sends this file 
to PORTAL.
RIPOCS checks whether a WV-STUF-K30.xml is available on PORTAL and if so copies it. 
After that it decrypts the information in each OCR line using the key Kocrkp which is 
only available on RIPOCS. After decrypting these lines, RIPOCS now knows both the Kp, 
and the AbelPI,. Together with the choice made by the voter, RIPOCS now computes the 
technical vote tha t corresponds to this choice. This is the same technical vote that would 
have been sent to the server if the voter voted by Internet. The resulting list of all these 
technical votes is sent by RIPOCS to PORTAL again, where it can be used in the tally 
process.
Note tha t Figure 4 does not really indicate tha t many of the tasks are done in parallel. The 
receiving and scanning of ballots and hence also the transformation to technical votes is a 
repeating process tha t cannot be modeled properly in this type of diagram.
4 .2 .6  V ote  co llectio n  — in detail: H elp d esk
The main task of the Helpdeks is providing information and assistance to voters on how 
to exercise their voting rights. Here we shall concentrate on the most security-sensitive 
aspect, namely providing replacement votes, on request.
As already described the file K11 contains both test and replacement forms. They are 
not related but handled in the same file (K11) because of similarities in shape. Both are 
different from ordinary vote forms: their UId’s starts with 9 or 99. The number of these 
(test and replacement) forms is determined on the basis of information in the file K10 with 
ordinary voting forms.
Test forms are meant for monitoring the system by various parties involved (HWH, DWCB, 
T T PI and SURFnet, and possibly others). These forms can be followed throughout the 
system and process. They do not contribute to the outcome.
Replacement forms are sent to the Helpdesk, from where they can be sent to voters that 
complain tha t their original forms are missing. These replacement forms do contribute to 
the outcome and are therefor extremely sensitive: they allow everyone who holds them to 
add votes to the system, while disabling some ordinary vote form. Replacement votes are 
added to RIES for pragmatic reasons, in order to make the system more user friendly, at 
the expense of introducing vulnerabilities. These replacement vulnerabilities are accepted 
and covered via procedural measures, mainly at the Helpdesk.
During operation of RIES-KOA (for expatriates) a substantial number of replacement forms 
was sent, due to the poor reliability of international postal services. However, during 
regional District Water Control Board elections the number is limited. Replacement forms 
can be provided only once per voter. When all replacement forms have been handed out,
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requests can no longer be answered: these forms are produced only during the initialization 
phase.
In Figure 5 it looks like the helpdesk (part of DWCB) sends out the new ballot before 
RIPOCS has modified the status bits of the reference table. This coincides with the de­
scription in [15]. Each mutation by the helpdesk is immediately sent to PORTAL, but 
RIPOCS only starts modifying the status bits in the reference tables when the election 
is closed. However, there is something strange here. RIPOCS does send a status report 
to PORTAL after it tried to handle all mutations, but it is not clear what can be done 
with this if the result parameter in this report is ERROR. W hat happens if RIPOCS fails 
to modify the status bits but the ballot is already sent? Since both the helpdesktool and 
RIPOCS use the same WV-STUF-K10.xml and WV-STUF-K11.xml files this should not hap­
pen. Furthermore, the fact tha t actually three RIPOCS machines are computing these 
changes, reduces the chance that this ERROR value will be returned. But nevertheless, 
if it does happen, there is a serious problem with the outcome of the elections since some 
votes might be counted that were invalid and some valid votes might not be counted.
Now let’s have a look at how it works. Each DWCB has its own helpdesk, tha t voters 
should contact (by phone) if they didn’t receive a ballot form or if they received a damaged 
form or envelope. According to [15] this is what the helpdesk should do.
When replacement forms are requested the Helpdesk authenticates the requester by asking 
for personal identity or DWCB-tax related data. Unfortunately, most of these data are 
more or less public knowledge. W ith the answers to these questions, the Helpdesk uses 
its support software (helpdesktool) to link the claimed identity to an eligible Vn, and to 
the corresponding identity VnID,, see [18]. The tool will mark the status bits for VnID, as 
‘withdrawn’ in the reference table, or more precisely, in the second part of the reference 
table RDS.zip where status information is kept.
Furthermore it chooses one of the replacement ballot forms and sends it to the complaining 
voter. This form is identified by the so-called VrID,/. This VrID,/ is now reported as ‘issued’ 
to PORTAL and subsequently collected by RIPOCS. This ends the work of the helpdesk.
Of course, this can only be done during the voting phase, via the PORTAL.
In principle the number of ‘withdrawn’ and ‘issued’ status bits must coincide. However, in 
practice the number of ‘issued’ bits may be higher: someone may complain whose name 
is not in the list of eligible voters. This omission may turn  out to be a mistake, after 
contacting the responsible citizen administration authorities. In tha t case new voting forms 
are issued. The number of replacements is published after the elections, so tha t the scale 
of these changes becomes known.
A paper log of each replacement step is kept in the Helpdesk, which is signed by the 
individual Helpdesk member that handles it. This log should not contain any link between 
the identity (Vn, /  VnID,) and the identifier VrID,/ of the replacement form.
In [15] there is an explicit sentence that we would like to quote here:
Note is taken tha t the combination VnID, and VrID,/ is NOT recorded in any way 
(e.g. this can be handled by two different, separated elements of the helpdesk).
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Figure 5: Procedure for replacing ballot forms
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This is to ensure voter secrecy. Furthermore, any personal information in relation to the 
mailed VrID,/ is not needed, since any voter can only receive one replacement package.
4 .2 .7  V ote  co llectio n  — in detail: M on itor in g
HWH is the central organization tha t keeps track of the whole election for all 26 DWCBs. 
Main source for HWH is PORTAL, which provides several systems of monitoring the elec­
tions in use on PORTAL. On its turn  PORTAL typically gets its information from the 
collection of all VotWins. The communication for this is described in [5] as XML/RPC 
calls for control messages and scp for file transport over the VPN protected RIES-control 
network, always originating from PORTAL. Each VotWin is configured so tha t connections 
to this specific URL are only allowed from PORTAL.
The first system uses so-called PortalMessages. They are used to give feedback to operators 
of functions that are performed. A PortalMessage is sent by PORTAL to specific operators, 
who can only read them when they log on to PORTAL. A second system uses SMS. Main 
difference is that these messages also reach their target when the operators are not logged 
in to the system. For each operator a phone number is stored in the system.
A third system of monitoring is the idea of ‘current tally’. While the election phase is still 
running it is possible to perform a tally process on the votes already cast. Because it is not 
legal to see a partial election result during the election this report will be stored encrypted. 
Its use lies in the fact tha t after the election has been closed it can be decrypted. And, if a 
series of these current tallies are available, it might be possible to detect where something 
has gone wrong.
Encryption of the confidential data is done by a randomly generated 3DES encipher key 
K preta l, which is only exportable under a public key PK notp reta l with the proper cer­
tificate. For practical and performance reasons PORTAL doesn’t use crypto hardware, but 
computes everything in software. This software has been reviewed by an independent, but 
for us unknown, company in the Netherlands. So we have to trust tha t the software used 
here only keeps the clear pre-tally result in memory.
One of the issues here is how PORTAL performs this current tally job. First it gets the 
current votes from VotWin. This is a critical part of the task. As we have seen before, 
typical calls from PORTAL to VotWin are done via XM L/RPC or scp over the protected 
RIES-control network.
Once the votes are available on PORTAL, the current tally job is basically the same as the 
final tally job, which will be described later. Besides the encrypted report it also creates 
an unencrypted report with status information like the number of votes cast.
A fourth system for monitoring the elections is again based upon voting statistics. PORTAL 
periodically sends requests to each VotWin to get a list of the numbers of votes cast for 
each election. This information is used by PORTAL to generate graphics.
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4 .2 .8  T ally ing  — overv iew
The following tasks are handled during the tallying stage.
• The votes are being counted by the system.
• The election authority publishes the provisional results.
•  The election authority deals with all incoming objections against the provisional re­
sult. This may include advice by the so-called umpire.
• Eventually the final results are published.
4 .2 .9  T ally ing  — in detail: ta lly  p rocess
In Figure 6 we have described how the tally process works. Formally DWCB is in con­
trol. But since the election is normally stopped by the pre-installed time-value from 
WV-STUF-B10.xml, the last batch of postal ballots is sent by VPSB and the last helpdesk 
mutations are received, there is no actual action to be taken by DWCB to start the tally 
process and normally that would be best. But there might be unexpected situations to 
postpone the start of tally, which in general would not be desirable. Therefore HWH has 
to perform a final OK action to start the tally. This is in line with HWHs task to overview 
the entire organization of all DWCB elections.
The tallying phase officially starts when the election is ended. The elections are ended 
automatically by PORTAL, based upon the end date, time and delay tha t was defined in 
the configuration file WV-STUF-B10.xml. It signals VotWin to close the ballot boxes. Next 
step is tha t PORTAL retrieves all the technical votes from the VotWins.
Before the actual counting can start the last batch of postal votes received by VPSB needs 
to be processed. As we have seen in Figure 4 VPSB doesn’t wait with processing all the 
forms to the moment tha t the election is closed. This is scheduled as a periodical batch 
process and hence only the last batch needs to be processed. The scanning part is done by 
VPSB, but via PORTAL the WV-STUF-K30.xml file gets to RIPOCS who does the actual 
conversion to technical votes and sends the result back to PORTAL.
In a similar way, also the last mutations of the helpdesk need to be taken care of before the 
counting can start. In particular this also requires action by RIPOCS to block or activate 
certain ballot forms by changing their status in the reference table. Since these status fields 
are being used during the counting process this is obviously something tha t has to be done 
before the actual counting can start.
At this stage PORTAL has all the technical votes: both the ones tha t come from postal 
votes as well as the ones tha t come from Internet. Since the format of both type of votes is 
the same they can be easily merged. Im portant is tha t they get a so-called priority label, 
indicating whether they were cast by post or by Internet. This is needed to deal with the 
fact tha t voters can try  to vote twice by sending in an Internet vote and a postal vote.
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Figure 6: Determining the outcome of the elections
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Based upon the priority the system is able to determine which of these votes should be 
counted in the tally.
The actual counting process is basically easy: for each technical vote the RnPID, and RnCx^j 
values are computed using the key-less hash MDC-2. These are the values tha t are in the 
reference table and form the link between a vote and actual candidate. The result of this 
action is sorted on RnPID,, priority and RnCx^j. Now for each cluster of equal RnPID^s the 
following steps are done.
• If the RnPID, is not valid, i.e. it is not in the reference table, all votes in this cluster 
are marked invalid with a reference to this reason.
• Otherwise the status of this RnPID, is checked. If one of the three status bits indicate 
tha t the vote should not be counted, again all votes in this cluster are marked as 
invalid for the appropriate reason.
• Now tha t the voter is considered valid, each vote is checked. Note tha t they are 
ordered by priority from high to low. The first check is on the validity of RnCx^j. If 
it is not valid this vote is marked invalid.
• If it is valid, it is checked whether there are more votes within the same priority. If 
this is not the case, all other votes are marked invalid because of this.
• If there are other votes with the same priority, the RnCx^j in the next vote is checked. 
If it is invalid then this next vote will be marked as invalid. If it is valid then it is 
checked whether this next RnCx^j is equal to the current RnCx^j. If it is, the next 
vote is marked invalid for double vote, but the current vote is still considered valid. 
If it is not, both the current vote and this next vote are marked as invalid for the 
reason of contrary votes within priority.
• If a vote is valid, the corresponding candidate as defined in the reference table will 
get one more vote.
Eventually each vote in the list of technical votes is either marked as counted or as not 
counted. If it is counted, it is indicated for which candidate the vote is counted. If it is not 
counted, the reason why not is listed. This file is referred to as the ‘performed votes’ file.
Now the preliminary vote count is handed over to DWCB, who should formally accept this 
preliminary result before it can be published. Later on DWCB has to decide whether this 
will be the final outcome or not. Before they can do that, they wait for a short time frame 
to see whether some complaints from voters or verdicts from UMPIRE (see Section 4.2.10) 
are filed. Obviously this means that voters should have the chance to check the outcome 
of the elections. In order to support this, a lot of files are published on the Internet:
•  The updated reference tables,
•  A report with all mutations with respect to the status changes in the reference table,
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• A list of the plain technical votes received by Internet,
• The ‘performed votes’ file as described above.
• A list of receipt confirmation values. This list contains for each vote the ReSPID,, 
the ElID and the VotRecConSvr,j, which is the first half of the receipt confirmation 
value VotRecConCnt,j. In particular this is not the same value as VotRecConCnt,j, 
which was sent to the voter and should only be known to the voter.
If no objections are filed in time the DWCB will publish the final results.
4 .2 .10  T ally ing  — in detail: U M P IR E
Figure 7: Role of the UMPIRE
Part of the official tally process is tha t voters can check whether their vote shows up 
properly in the list of votes after the election. This scenario is depicted in Figure 7. If it 
doesn’t, they can use their receipt confirmation to complain about this at an independent 
arbiter, typically called UMPIRE.
Before UMPIRE can perform his tasks with respect to voters who complain. he first needs 
to do some checks on the material tha t he has received. For instance, UMPIRE gets a 
machine with crypto hardware tha t contains the Kbbs_0 key, which is supposed to be used 
by the VotWins to compute the VotRecCon,j. According to [16] this is a machine that 
is also called ROCMIS, but contains a crypto card that has been taken out of one of the
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VotWins. It is not really clear whether he is supposed to write his own software to compute 
all the receipts or whether the system comes with software that deals with this. For an 
independent role the first option would probably be better, but for practical reasons the 
second option is more likely. Now he needs to be sure that this key has indeed been used 
by those servers. Besides this key UMPIRE only has a list of all the technical votes and 
all published VotRecConSvr^j values sent through Internet since these lists are publicly 
available.
Now the first check tha t he should perform is to see whether the list of published receipt 
values corresponds with the technical votes received. For instance, the number of receipts 
should be less than the number of technical votes. This is due to the fact that only the 
receipt tha t belongs to the technical vote submitted last is stored and hence only this last 
one shows up in the list whereas all submitted technical votes show up. Furthermore, he 
should compute the VotRecCon^j of all technical votes. The first half of these VotRecCon^js 
should either show up in the list that was published or belong to a voter who submitted 
more than one vote. In the latter case this should make up for the difference in length of 
the lists assuming tha t double appearances of technical votes are treated properly. If this 
check is passed then UMPIRE knows that the key he has in his hardware really forms the 
link between the technical votes and the list of receipts.
However, in order to be sure that this key has actually been used during the election and not 
only after the election to generate this list, UMPIRE needs to check some votes of people 
tha t aren’t complaining. Did those people in fact have a VotRecConCnt^j tha t is indeed 
the second half of the VotRecCon^j tha t UMPIRE computes for them? If so it means that 
Kbbs_0 was indeed used during the elections.
Now if a voter complains that his technical vote doesn’t show up in the list of votes, this 
voter should present both his technical vote and his receipt confirmation to UMPIRE. Note 
tha t such a complaining voter can come up with basically any technical vote he wants, 
since they are publicly available in the reference tables. However, since only a list of 
VotRecConSvr^js is published, he will not be able to derive a valid VotRecConCnt^j from 
this information. Furthermore, the UMPIRE already knows that if the receipt came from 
the server, he can simply reproduce the VotRecCon^j tha t the server would have computed 
for this technical vote. Now if the receipt confirmation of the voter doesn’t coincide with 
the second half of the confirmation value that UMPIRE computes, the latter one knows 
tha t the VotRecConCnt^j tha t the voter presented to him cannot have been generated by 
the vote server and hence the verdict will be that the voter has no valid complaint. If the 
voter’s VotRecConCnt^j does coincide then the voter has a valid complaint and the outcome 
of the elections cannot be trusted anymore.
4.2 .11  F in a liza tion
After closing the elections and publishing the preliminary result some things need to be 
done. Here we list the ones tha t we consider important.
• Vote and tally verification by a voter or an independent party:
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If a voter did not store his technical vote somewhere he will not be able to check that 
his vote was counted correctly. If he did store it, the procedure supported by RIES 
says the following.
— Download the post-election table, listing all the received votes.
— Search for his VnPID, and VnCx^j in this file.
— On the same line both RnPID, and RnCx^j are listed.
— Furthermore, the candidate number and the status of the vote are given.
— A voter sees directly whether his vote was counted or not.
If the voter doesn’t find his vote, he can go to UMPIRE with his receipt VotRecConCnt^j. 
If his vote is there, but given to some other candidate he should complain at the 
DWCB. See Section 4.2.10 for details.
Besides the voter also independent parties can verify the outcome of the election. 
They should do the following.
— Download all received technical votes.
— For each technical vote, compute the MDC-2 of both parts.
— Search the pre-election reference table for these values.
— Each combination should lead to exactly one vote on a specific candidate.
— Special attention should be given to the rules that need to be followed when 
double votes occur.
• The procedure for voter objections:
The procedure for complaining when a voter cannot find his vote in the list of collected 
votes is already described in Section 4.2.10. However, the procedure for complaining 
if a voter finds his vote in the list, but sees tha t the vote is counted for a wrong 
candidate or sees that the vote is marked invalid for some reason is not completely 
described. The only thing written is tha t the voter should contact the DWCB as soon 
as possible and tha t its helpdesk will support the voter in filing an official complaint.
It is not clear what kind of evidence the voter should provide in order to support his 
claim besides the technical vote and the confirmation receipt. However, due to the 
nature of the system, it is not always possible to prove that such a voter’s claim is 
correct or incorrect. In such a situation the DWCB decides what to do.
• The destruction of sensitive material:
Unfortunately the documentation doesn’t seem to describe what happens with sen­
sitive information after the tally process. Only for PSB it is marked explicitly that 
the WV-STUF-C10.xml file needs to be destroyed. For other actors it is not clear how 
they archive their material.
W ith respect to the key management it is claimed tha t ROCMIS, RIPOCS and 
VotWin all work in application stages, where one of the last stages takes care of
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erasing all keys. For ROCMIS and RIPOCS it is indeed indicated in [16] that they 
have a requirement to erase essential keys after completion of election tasks. For 
VotWin this is not indicated exactly, but it is mentioned that it has at least func­
tionality to erase keys. However, it is not indicated how strict this ‘after completion 
of election tasks’ is implemented. Is it within a minute after all is done? Or within 
a week or month? For the keys like Kgenvoterkey tha t are no longer needed once 
the election is closed, they could be destroyed immediately after closing the elections. 
For the keys like Kbbs_0 tha t are needed by independent parties for research it seems 
logical that the keys are destroyed when those parties decide tha t they have finished 
their work.
4 .3  C om pon en ts
4.3 .1  V oter P C  and In tern et C on n ection
RIES is designed in such a way tha t voters should be able to use their own PC with standard 
browser to express their votes. The design document [18] says tha t 99% of the voters should 
be able to cast their vote without adaptation of their PC. This percentage is formulated on 
the basis of earlier helpdesk experiences and logs.
The (cryptographic) operations on the client side are done within the voter’s browser using 
the scripting language JavaScript. Since any voter can inspect the source of the webpages, 
the client side software is de facto  open source. It includes, in particular, an implementation 
of DES in JavaScript, taken from an open library5.
The following features are assumed about the client’s browser.
• JavaScript must be enabled; if not, the user is directed to a special page where the 
options are explained: switch on JavaScript, use another computer, or vote with the 
postal ballot,
•  cookies are not used,
• SSL must be supported, with very specific version requirements tha t are comparable 
to Internet banking,
• screen resolution of 800 x 600, minimally.
The webpages of the RIES system have been developed following common webstandards, 
not for a specific browsers. Pages have been tested for Internet Explorer (versions 5, 6, 7), 
Firefox, Mozilla Suite, Safari, Opera. It is reported to have been used also on PDAs, even 
though not officially supported.
Interfacing is considered by some to be the most im portant issue in e-voting, in order 
to avoid a bias in the presentation of the options towards certain parties or candidates.
5Namely h t tp : / / te r o .c o .u k /d e s /  of Paul Tero, July 2001.
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Independent consultation—on a previous candidate-based version, and not on the most 
recent party-based one—has contributed to the usability of the webpages of RIES (also for 
the disabled). The focus has been put mostly on clarity and unambiguity, and not so much 
on lack of bias.
Some voters may go directly to the webpage of their preferred candidate and thus reveal 
their choice to the server. Such a possible leak of information has been addressed in RIES 
by sending all candidates in bundled form to the voter’s machine. In practice this involves 
a modest amount of information (only text).
Possible malicious software on the voter’s side is not addressed in RIES. It is left to the 
individual voter to be able to use an appropriately protected machine.
Bandwidth is not an issue: the webpages tha t have been used so far contain only a modest 
amount of graphics. They work well even on a slow (modem or mobile) connection.
4 .3 .2  R IE S S y stem  A rch itectu re
Here we’ll give a short description of the system architecture used in several parts of RIES. 
PO R T A L
The PORTAL is the web service tha t facilitates the workflow of an entire election process. 
Typically there is only one PORTAL machine available, however, a stand in machine is 
available if the original PORTAL goes down. Since PORTAL is not a machine tha t has a 
high load during the election process it doesn’t seem necessary to mirror it. It uses an 
Apache Tomcat 5.5 servlet container. Furthermore it uses a MySQL database. Authen­
tication to this server is done by SMS, using a HTTPS connection to a telcom provider. 
Communication with VotWin is done via XML-RPC or scp over the RIES-control network. 
Communication with RIPOCS is done via SCP, initiated by RIPOCS. Also important is 
the file system. W ithin the normal local file system, a special area is called the Election File 
Workspace. This directory is used for all the critical files needed for the system. Technically, 
it is divided in subtrees. For instance each DWCB has its own subspace. Furthermore, a 
special area within this Election File Workspace is dedicated for file transmission between 
PORTAL and RIPOCS. This workspace is protected by the normal user access control 
systems that the operating system provides.
P riv a te  N etw ork
All servers are connected via the SURFnet 6 backbone. The different VotWins are located in 
Tilburg, Utrecht, Amsterdam and Nijmegen. Besides the fact tha t the backbone used is one 
of the fastest and most trustworthy networks currently available, we also need to mention 
here tha t the network is completely glass fibre and if there is one network problem, traffic is 
automatically redirected and hence all servers will remain reachable. In fact, before no one 
of the four servers is available, there need to be at least eight severe network problems at
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the same time. So availability of at least one server should not be a problem. Furthermore, 
four servers are used to make sure tha t also during peak hours the voters will not notice 
slow response times.
Besides the physical network tha t we have described above, we should also say something 
about the way the network is used. As we have seen there are four locations for VotWins. 
Furthermore, there is also one location for PORTAL, which might coincide with one of the 
previously mentioned locations. In addition some laptops are available for doing remote 
management on the servers. Communication between different locations always goes over 
a VPN dedicated to the RIES system. However, since both VotWin and PORTAL are not 
just one machine, also communication within the locations is needed. This communication 
always takes place over a private LAN. For instance PORTAL needs to communicate with 
three RIPOCS systems. And each VotWin needs to communicate between the so-called 
front-end server tha t is used for presenting static webpages and the back-end server tha t is 
used for dynamical content and for instance also contains the database. Each VotWin has 
one designated database-server (‘Stembus’) to deliver the casted vote. This database-server 
handles the storage of the casted vote locally and on all (but at least one) database-servers 
on the other locations. Communication between VotWin and the designated database­
server is, under normal conditions, over the private LAN and communication between the 
database-servers is over the dedicated RIES-VPN.
For communication typically XM L/RPC calls over H TTP are used for control messages. 
Because of the VPN protection between locations and the private network within a location, 
it was an explicit choice not to use the slower HTTPS. If files need to be transported from 
one machine to another, this is always done using secure copy over SSH, usually referred 
to as scp.
The communication between VotWin and a voter client is restricted to the casting of the 
technical vote by the client and the return of the receipt to the client. In all other parts of 
the protocol there is no dependency of the client on a specific VotWin. In case of service 
interruptions on one VotWin, the casting of votes will continue almost uninterrupted to 
each client by the other VotWins. In case of doubt on the side of the voter about the 
successful completion of casting his vote, he can just repeat his voting action. He either 
receives the status of his former vote casting (as voter status is synchronized among all 
VotWins) or can complete his cast the second time.
C ryp tograp h ic  H ardw are
In order to prevent that one organization has all the important keys, RIES-2008 uses 
hardware crypto for doing the critical computations. The hardware used is of the type 
IBM 4764 PCI-X, which is FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 4 certified by NIST [23]. See [16] for 
more details on this device. One of the important features is tha t for each key it can be 
explicitly specified whether it can be exported or not. However, because some of the keys 
need to be available at several places, it needs to be possible to clone a complete hardware 
crypto device. This is possible with the IBM 4764. The standard cloning procedures from 
IBM’s Common Cryptographic Architecture [8], [7] are used. Typically all three RIPOCS
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machines have a crypto card. Furthermore each of the four VotWins has such a crypto 
card. Also the UMPIRE has a machine that is equipped with a crypto card, but PORTAL 
does all its crypto in software. Because of the fact tha t once the cloning session is ended 
it is no longer possible to clone a card again, some spare cards are created and stored in a 
safe as backup for serious hardware failure.
P S B  - P r in tin g  S erv ice  B u reau
The PSB is a critical node in the whole RIES setup where sensitive data (WV-STUF-C10. xml) 
are handled in the clear, namely in order to print name and address information, together 
with personal keys. W ith this information one can not only vote on behalve of someone 
else, but also, if copied, check later who voted what. The PSB receives WV-STUF-C10.xml 
in encrypted form, via its public key PKpsbc10, from PORTAL. After finishing its printing 
job, destruction of WV-STUF-C10.xml is required. If and how such destruction is actually 
supervised is not clear.
In RIES-2008 the PSB is a foreign (non-Dutch) commercial company.
V P S B  - P o sta l V otes P ro cess in g  B u reau
Processing postal votes to convert them into technical votes tha t can be tallied by the RIES 
tallying process is outsourced to a company.
B acku p  /  red u n d an cy
As stated before there are four redundant VotWins and three redundant RIPOCS systems 
all online. For PORTAL there are two redundant machines, but only one of them is online. 
The second one is configured as hot-standby and can be made active when needed. Due 
to the sensitive nature of the data on the servers no backups are made. In case of the loss 
of a server it will be rebuilt from scratch using a provisioning server. Data loss is prevented 
by several mechanisms, specifically using redundant hardware and synchronization between 
locations.
4 .4  T he cryptographic protocol
The one-time signature scheme used by RIES is described as follows. Rather than gen­
erating the key pairs for each voter independently, which usually means that the private 
keys are generated uniformly at random and independent of each other, all key pairs are 
generated from a master key, called Kgenvoterkey. The individual key pairs are derived 
from Kgenvoterkey as diversified keys using additional inputs such as a voter ID etc. We 
model the presence of the master key by an additional set-up algorithm in the one-time 
signature scheme, to stress that all keys are actually related.
The one-time signature scheme thus becomes:
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•  Set up. A probabilistic algorithm that generates a 112-bit 3DES-key, called 
Kgenvoterkey.
•  K ey  gen eration . A deterministic algorithm that on input of the master key 
Kgenvoterkey, a list of messages {Cm,},, and a diversifier consisting of a voter ID 
VnID,, an additional AbelPI,, a voter group ParGp, and an election ID ElID, outputs 
a unique private key Kp,, defined as
sk : =  Kp, =  (VPIDm , VPID2,,) =  3DES(Kgenvoterkey, VnID,||ElID||ParGp),
and a corresponding public key defined as
pk  : =  (RnPID,, {RnCx,j},),
where
RnPID, =  MDC-2(DESmac(Kp,, f  (BalBxID))),
RnCx,j =  MDC-2(DESmac(Kp,, f  (AbelPI,, Cm,))).
Here f  is a simple padding function.
•  S ign atu re  gen eration . A deterministic algorithm tha t on input of a message Cm, 
and a private key sk =  Kp,, outputs as signature the pair
s := (VnPID,, VnCx,,),
where
VnPID, =  DESmac(Kp,,f (BalBxID)),
VnCx,j =  DESmac(Kp,,f (AbelPI,, Cm,)).
•  S ign atu re  verification . A deterministic algorithm that on input of a message Cm,, a 
public key pk =  (RnPID,, {RnCx,j},), and a purported signature s =  (a, b), determines 
whether s is a valid signature on Cm, w.r.t. public key pk  by checking that
MDC-2 (a) =  RnPID,, and 
MDC-2(b) =  RnCx,j
holds.
Given one signature for a key pair, it is not feasible to find a second signature (for a different 
message) for the same key pair. The first part of each signature, however, is equal, hence 
breaking the signature scheme amounts to inverting exactly one application of the MDC-2 
function.
An election is run as follows. The set-up algorithm is run to generate the master key 
Kgenvoterkey. This is the only probabilistic part of the election protocols. Subsequently,
version 1.0, June 24, 2008 42
Description and Analysis of RIES
the key generation algorithm is run centrally, for each voter (plus some additional ones). 
All the secret keys and public keys are written in two files, respectively. The file with public 
keys is made publicly known; the file with secret keys is used to produce the printed ballot 
papers. There is a built-in link between the voter’s identities VnID, and voter’s name and 
addresses Vn,, as VnID, is derived from the voter’s BSN, hence linked to the real-life identity 
of a voter. The printed ballot paper containing (VPIDi ,,, VPID2,,) will be sent to Vn,.
A voter will use (VPIDi ,,, VPID2,,) to compute a valid vote (VnPID,, VnCx,,,) for the chosen 
candidate Cm,. The signature (VnPID,, VnCx,,,) is stored by the voting server. Note that in 
principle there is no reason why a signature should consist of two pre-images rather than 
just one. That is, normally the component VnPID, should be redundant in the presence of 
VnCx,,, (and in the presence of ReSPID,, see below). However, the cryptographic mechanisms 
as employed by RIES necessitate the use of two pre-images (as the pre-images are only 64 
bits each; this is much worse than a single pre-image of 128 bits).
Upon successful completion of the voting protocol, a voter also gets a receipt. The receipt 
cannot be verified by the voter though. The voter needs to store or record the receipt for 
later use, if desired, when checking the election results. A receipt is actually a MAC of the 
following form:
VotRecConjj- =  (VotRecConSvr,j ,  VotRecConCnt,j )  = DESmac(Kbbs_0, VnPID,||VnCxjj),
where Kbbs_0 is a master key used by the voting server. In other words, the voter’s vote 
consisting of the one-time signature s = (VnPID,, VnCxjj) is MACed using the key Kbbs_0. 
The voter only gets the VotRecConCnt,,, half. Note tha t a receipt can only be verified with 
knowledge of the master key Kbbs_0.
Tallying is basically done by comparing the received pairs (VnPID,, VnCx,,,) with the public 
keys of all voters. Each time a match is found (i.e., when (VnPID,, VnCx,,,) is a valid 
signature w.r.t. a given public key and a candidate Cm,), the score for the corresponding 
candidate is incremented by 1. (In the actual RIES system it is also possible tha t more 
than one vote is issued per voter, e.g., one by Internet and one by postal mail. A paper 
ballot is converted by the RIES system into a digital vote, by reconstructing the voter’s key 
Kp, and then simply computing (VnPID,, VnCx,,,) for the candidate indicated by the voter 
on the ballot. The double votes are then resolved according to some pre-defined rules.)
All received pairs (VnPID,, VnCx,,,) are published, such that anyone can recompute the elec­
tion result, also using the public keys of all voters. In addition, the VotRecConCnt,,, halves 
of voter receipts are published as well, next to the corresponding votes (VnPID,, VnCx,,,).
In addition to the main cryptographic protocol, the following mechanism is used to facilitate 
handling of voters during an election. To keep track of a voter’s status the following value 
is used, which is derived directly from the voter’s private key Kp, as follows:
ReSPID, =  MDC-2 (DESmac (Kp,, ElID||ExtParGp)).
There is no cryptographic reason why an MDC-2 is applied to the MAC value in this case; 
note that an 8-byte DESmac is expanded to a 16-byte MDC-2 value. Also, the value of ReSPID, 
is known to several parties throughout the system so it is not really used as a secret value, 
but rather as a value unique to each voter.
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5 Security analysis o f RIES
In this chapter we analyze the security of RIES. We start with a few security issues we 
have come across that we have not seen addressed before. Then we analyse RIES against 
the criteria discussed in Chapter 2.
Previous papers analyzing security aspects of (variants of) RIES are [6], [12] and [9].
5.1 Som e Issues
In this section some concrete issues and attacks are described, which are not addressed by 
the cryptographic protocol nor by the procedural steps.
5.1 .1  Forging V otes
Prior to the election the list L =  {(RnPID,, {RnCx,,,},)}, is published. Individual votes 
VnPID,, VnCx,,, will be accepted only if the verification against this list succeeds. The 
problem is, however, tha t both VnPID, and VnCx,,, are only 64 bits in length. (The fact 
tha t these values are actually MAC values is irrelevant to the forgery attack, as described 
here.)
An attacker with access to the public list L, but without access to the voter’s private keys 
or any other secret values, may proceed as follows. Suppose for the purpose of illustration 
tha t the public list consists in total6 of 231 different hash values (MDC-2 images). it follows 
tha t if one picks a 64-bit string x uniformly at random, tha t with probability 2-33 it will 
hold tha t MDC-2(x) appears on the list L. Therefore, if we create a list of length 233 of 
different random 64-bit strings, with probability 1, we see that we find a pre-image for one 
of the hash values appearing on list L.
Since the MDC-2 pre-images are already random (as these are MAC values), it suffices for 
the attacker to deterministically try the hash values of x =  0, x =  1, x =  2, and so on. The 
attacker may actually prepare a database of values {MDC-2(x) | 0 < x < B} for some bound 
B, and put this database in sorted order. There is no need to store the full MDC-2 value 
of 128 bits; storing 64 bits or even less should be fine. W ithout any further optimizations, 
the storage requirement would be 232 times 64 bits, or 32 GBytes of storage.
W ith probability close to 1, the pre-image x corresponds to a vote different than cast by 
the legitimate voter, and the attacker may thus replace such a vote by its own vote. The 
amount of work is thus very limited.7 The attacker cannot control in advance for which 
candidate or party the replaced vote will be, but repeating the attack a sufficient number
6In the Dutch District Water Control Boards elections with 180 candidates (on average; 15 candidates 
per party, 12 parties per sub-election) and 12 million eligible voters, we get in total about 2.2 x 109 ~  231 
hash values. The expected number of collisions in this list is below 1.
7MDC-2 requires 2 applications of DES to process one input block. COPACOBANA is claimed (CHES 
2007) to achieve 400 x 106 DES encryptions per second per 40 euro FPGA at 100 MHz, versus 2 x 106 DES 
encryptions per 80 euro Pentium-4 at 3 GHz. See http://w w w .copacobana.org/.
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of times will soon lead to success. The attack can be repeated as many times as desired, 
such that a sizeable fraction of the votes can be forged. The total effort will still be much 
lower than a brute-force DES key search.
Note tha t it does not m atter tha t an election is actually divided into sub-elections. The 
attack takes as input all published hash values, gathered from all sub-elections. The attack 
is also independent of any keys used, possibly specific to each sub-election. This is due to 
the fact tha t casting a legitimate vote boils down to producing correct one-time signatures, 
which consist of two 64-bit values: VnPID,, VnCx,,,. The attacker only needs to forge the 
second part, copying the first one from the vote cast by the legitimate voter. Also, note 
tha t the bulk of the attack can be prepared beforehand: i t’s a m atter of computing and 
storing a large table of the form {MDC-2(x) | 0 < x < B} in sorted order. Once the list of 
public keys of all voters is published, one can simply run a matching algorithm. The attack 
can be performed trivially in parallel, using disjoint subsets of {MDC-2(x) | 0 < x < B}.8
An attack as described above depends on access to the received votes, hence probably to 
the voting servers, before the tally phase starts. Probably the easiest way to achieve this 
is with insider help. It is conceivable that the attack might even be mounted in such a 
manner that the vote receipt will be calculated for the replaced vote, in stead of for the 
original vote. In that case, a complaining voter will not be able to prove that his intended 
vote was different. As a consequence, the handling of the votes (voted ballots) must be 
done much more securely, as the cryptographic protection is insufficient.
Countermeasures to prevent this attack are not hard to find and implement. A simple 
counter to diversify the VnPID, values for one voter over all candidates suffices.
5.1 .2  Secure P C s
RIES assumes tha t the voter’s PCs are secure. Attackers may however employ malware 
or even ‘man-in-the-browser’ attacks to capture voter’s PCs. Powerful attackers may thus 
change votes, and so this involves a unique potential risk for Internet elections.
5.1 .3  S ta tu s  o f  cryp tan a lysis  for th e  cryp tograp h ic  m ech an ism s
RIES uses single DES, rather than the more secure 3DES, for DESmac-operations to be per­
formed by the voter. The reason is that these keys have to be typed in by humans of 
varying typing capabilities, and thus should be not too long to keep the typing error rate 
low. As a result the effective key length of operations with the voter key is 56 bits. In the 
cryptographic community this is commonly seen as rather weak. Apparently in the RIES 
design this is seen as acceptable.
According to [24], MDC-2 based on DES allows collision attacks using 255 hashing operations 
(which more or less matches the key size of 56 bits), and preimage attacks using 283 hashing
8Activists may discredit the elections by publishing all the hits found, and anyone interested can join to 
compute further hits.
version 1.0, June 24, 2008 45
Description and Analysis of RIES
operations. Though DESmac based on DES is not the strongest MAC available, the known 
attacks are not an immediate threat.
The hash function SHA-1, used for computing commitments to tables published for verifia­
bility of the election process and results, is known to be vulnerable to collision attacks of, 
presently, about 260 compression function operations [20]. Again, known attacks on SHA-1 
are no immediate threat, but it should have almost no impact on the operation of RIES to 
replace SHA-1 by a hash function tha t still does meet its design criteria, such as SHA-256.
5.2 V erification o f th e  requirem ents
In this section we analyse to what extent the design of RIES-2008 meets the criteria de­
scribed in Chapter 2, and to what extent RIES-2008 has reached improvements over RIES- 
KOA.
1. tra n s p a r e n c y  The election process should be organized in such a way that the struc­
ture and organization is clear, so that everyone in principle can understand it. There 
m ust be no secrets in the election process: questions m ust be able to be answered, and 
the answers m ust be verifiable.
The structure and organization of RIES-2008 are reasonably clear. Extensive docu­
mentation is provided by the designers and organizers (especially about the system 
design [15, 18]). Understanding the details requires a certain amount of technical ex­
pertise, but there are no secrets (except, necessarily, particular cryptographic keys). 
Design decisions regarding cryptographic details are however at various places ill- 
motivated and hard to understand for a cryptographic expert.
The source code of the system will shortly become openly available for inspection. 
The value of this availability is of course limited, because it is hard to verify tha t the 
published code is also the one running on the system. Proper auditing procedures 
should be in place to increase the required trust.
In general the designers and organizers have an open attitude, have discussed the 
working of their system openly with everyone interested and have organized several 
workshops about RIES, in its various incarnations.
In the transition from RIES-KOA to RIES-2008 separation of duties and responsibil­
ities has improved: where in RIES-KOA the design and development team also had 
operational duties, this is not allowed anymore in RIES-2008.
2. v e r if ia b ili ty  The election process should be objectively verifiable. The verification 
tools may differ, depending on the method o f voting that is decided upon.
Verifiability in RIES-2008 is organized at three levels.
•  Each individual voter can verify, on the basis of his technical vote, whether his 
actual vote has been taken into account. This works by looking up the technical 
vote in the tables of performed votes (preliminary) or of final results. This form
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of verifiability requires that sufficiently many voters actually check their votes. 
There is no reliable information about what percentage of people really do this. 
In particular, eligible voters who do not cast a vote, will in general not verify 
tha t no vote has been registered for their Kp,. And if they do and notice that 
a vote has actually been cast, then they have no way to prove that they didn’t 
actually cast the vote (of course, they don’t have a receipt).
When the voter receives the confirmation receipt it is not possible to check 
whether it is appropriate—since it is computed by the vote server using a secret 
key (namely Kbbs_0). Therefore, disputes can be resolved only to a limited 
extent, as briefly illustrated above.
• The calculation of the end-results can be done by everyone interested, on the 
basis of the tables with final results (as provided by the organizers). However, 
one cannot check tha t the results appearing in these tables are actually the 
results as intended by the voters.
• The umpire can check and recalculate various steps in the whole process and pass 
his own judgement. But the umpire can handle only a limited type of disputes. 
The use of the receipt VotRecConCnt,j is limited. A voter has no way to check 
the validity of VotRecConCnt,j when it is sent to the voter at the conclusion of 
the voting protocol. The reason is that verification requires access to the secret 
key Kbbs_0. Second, a voter may present a fake VotRecConCnt,j and claim that 
it was sent by the voting server. Also, the voter may claim that even though the 
receipt is present, tha t the voter actually voted for a different candidate but the 
system apparently recorded it wrongly, and even delivered a wrong receipt to 
the voter (i.e., a correct receipt but for a different vote). The umpire can notice 
and report anomalies, but it is not clear tha t he can resolve them all.
Independent implementations of individual voter verification and calculation of tally 
results can be used shortly after the election closure, making use of the published 
reference and performed votes tables. For RIES-KOA such an implementation was 
provided by the Radboud University Nijmegen. Verification of an individual vote by 
such a service implies that the voter has to expose his vote to the service. One could 
imagine that political parties are interested in setting up verification services.
3. fa ir n e s s  /  in te g r ity  The election process should operate in a proper manner, and 
the results m ust not be capable o f being influenced other than by the casting of lawful 
votes.
This requirement is not fulfilled because of what must be regarded as the greatest 
structural weakness in the design of RIES: at a central level crucial secret keys (the 
Kp ,) are generated—and available in the clear at certain stages (notably printing)—for 
all individual voters. Also via the replacement packages it is possible to manipulate 
votes. Hence it is, in principle, possible tha t the results are ‘capable of being influenced 
other than by the casting of lawful votes’.
It should however be noted that RIES-2008 has improved considerably over RIES-
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KOA in this aspect, because all important master keys are now generated and oper­
ated in tamper-resistant cryptographic hardware, and cannot be exposed to humans.
Also, since votes are not encrypted, the voting server sees all votes as soon as they 
are cast. Therefore, the voting server is able to perform intermediate tallies9, which 
is not allowed, as intermediate election results may influence the proceedings of the 
election. The fact tha t the voting server receives and stores the votes in the clear is 
also a serious weakness.
In Section 5.1 a forging attack is described, tha t requires cooperation of an insider, 
and then enables an attacker to forge a notable amount of votes.
The measures to mitigate these risks in RIES-2008 are organizational. Ideally, this 
requirement is enforced by the cryptographic structure of the voting system.
4. e lig ib ility  to  v o te  Only persons eligible to vote m ust be allowed to take part in the 
election.
Essentially the procedure for RIES is the same for as for other elections for public 
bodies in the Netherlands: citizens receive their ballot on the basis of the citizen 
administration (GBA). However, RIES adds one thing: because the reference table is 
published in advance, the maximal number of possible votes is fixed in advance. It is 
thus in principle possible to trace this number back to the source (the GBA), making 
fraudulent addition of voters, if any, visible.
5. equal su ffra g e  /  u n ic i ty  Each voter, given the Dutch election system, m ust be 
allowed to cast only one vote in each election, which m ust be counted precisely once.
The tally-system helps in enforcing this property, once one assumes that an eligible 
voter gets hold of precisely one ballot. However, note that a voter’s key Kp, is used 
at various places in the system and one must assume tha t no insider takes advantage 
of its access to a such a copy of the voter’s key. W ith access to Kp,, one may issue 
a second vote (e.g., by Internet for a voter who only used a postal ballot), as a 
consequence of which the voter’s original vote may not be counted.
6. f r e e  su ffra g e  /  v o te  fr e e d o m  Every elector m ust be able to choose how to vote in  
complete freedom, free from  influence.
W ithin postal and Internet systems like RIES this requirement is the sole responsibil­
ity of the individual voter. A voter can, in principle, sell his vote, or can be coerced to 
vote for a particular candidate. A voter can simply send a copy of Kp, to a coercer, e.g. 
by email. (Note that Kp, is printed in a human-friendly manner in the material sent 
to a voter.). The coercer does not have to see the voter’s ballot papers at all, because 
the validity of Kp, can be checked against the public list {(RnPID,, {RnCx,j}j)},. This 
is done simply by generating some test votes, and checking the validity of these—if
9Actually, this is even standard procedure in RIES, in the so-called pre-tallying process, for monitoring 
reasons. Pre-tally results are encrypted under a public key for which the corresponding decryption key is 
available only to a notary.
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desired, the coercer simply runs test votes for all candidates to be absolutely sure 
tha t Kp, is valid.
The fact tha t voters can later prove what they have voted aggravates this point, since 
a coercer may demand to see the technical vote, as proof.
Hence this requirement is not fulfilled within RIES, like for postal votes.
7. se cre t su ffra g e  /  v o te  secrecy  I t m ust be impossible to connect the identity o f a 
person casting a vote to the vote cast. The process should be organized in such a way 
that it is impossible to make a voter indicate how he or she voted.
The situation is partly as for the previous requirement: in the personal environment 
of the voter, the secrecy of the connection between voter and the vote that is cast is 
the responsibility of the voter. Once the vote is expressed via the Internet and stored 
inside the system, secrecy depends on the way the personal keys Kp, are handled. As 
stated before, secrecy of these keys depends on organizational matters. Additionally, 
vote servers can link the originating IP address to the vote that is cast (using the 
reference table): there is no anonymous channel. Again, organizational measures 
must prevent such linking.
8. a c c ess ib ility  Voters should be enabled as fa r as possible to participate directly in the 
election process. I f  this is impossible, there m ust be a way of taking part indirectly, 
i.e. by proxy.
In comparison to (ordinary) elections in poll stations one may argue that accessibility 
is better in RIES because physically disabled people can vote at home. In general 
voters are not forced to use the Internet, since they can still vote via postal ballots.
6 C onclusion
RIES is an evolving family of systems (RIES-2004, RIES-KOA, RIES-2008) for electronic 
elections via the Internet. It has been used in practice for a number of District Water 
Control Board elections (involving millions of potential voters, but hundreds of thousands 
actual voters) and for expatriates in national parliament elections (involving hundreds of 
thousands of potential and tens of thousands actual voters). It is among the ‘largest’ 
Internet voting systems worldwide, in terms of actual use, and maybe even the largest. 
This deployment of RIES has resulted in valuable experience and expertise in how to run 
Internet elections.
RIES has been developed in a specific context, in which postal (District Water Control 
Board) elections form the framework of comparison. Hence certain reasonable goals for 
elections (like vote freedom) have been out of scope from the start. Also, this framework 
did not allow any (technical) requirements on the voter’s side, such as availability of smart 
cards: only a standard, reasonably up-to-date PC could be used, that is assumed to be 
trusted. As discussed in Section 5, the general voting requirements formulated by the
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Korthals Altes Committee [11] are not all satisfied: not only vote freedom but also vote 
integrity and confidentiality are not structurally guaranteed.
RIES is built on certain cryptographic primitives, like one-time signatures, which are real­
ized via hash functions and encryption with centrally generated keys for individual voters. 
There are no anonymous channels. The structural protection and safeguards offered by 
cryptography are rather limited. Many of the guarantees thus rely on organizational con­
trols, notably with respect to (voter) key generation, production of postal packages, insider 
attacks (especially at the server), integrity and authenticity of the software, and helpdesk 
procedures.
RIES-2008 is designed and built in an open spirit. Its source code will shortly be available 
openly for inspection. Also much (design) documentation will become publicly available. 
Additionally, the designers and organizers have put considerable effort in publicly explain­
ing and discussing their system. The actual running of RIES elections also involves an 
independent umpire that has access to the internals and can run his own checks after the 
election.
One of the distinguishing aspects of RIES is tha t it allows independent recounts of the 
final outcome and individual checks to see if own votes have been included. This is an 
interesting and useful feature in itself, but does not compensate for the structural weakness 
of the limited use of cryptography, and the conclusions tha t can be drawn from these 
individual checks are limited.
The whole technical and organizational set-up is, as far as we could see from a study of 
the documentation, carefully designed. Various controls are in place to oversee the proper 
execution of all the required steps. There are however pragmatic elements in the system— 
such as the use of replacement packages—that are open to manipulation and abuse, notably 
by insiders. The RIES Internet election system also offers potentially dangerous ways for 
manipulation of elections, in principle applicable on a large scale and different from attacks 
on postal elections.
In a larger context we see RIES (esp. RIES-2008) as a project tha t yields valuable hands-on 
experience and expertise on how to organize and run electronic elections. RIES does not 
use the best that cryptography has to offer in this area, but, to be fair, there is currently 
no agreed standard on what techniques to use for such elections. We do not think RIES- 
2008 is a suitable system for use outside a context of postal elections, and in particular not 
for ‘general’ elections (like for national/European parliaments or local/regional councils), 
given the current technical state of affairs and the reservations formulated in [11]. We 
do encourage further research, development and experiments to gain more experience in 
this area: Internet elections are increasingly used for various forms of elections (like within 
organizations) and using Internet elections for public bodies will probably remain looming 
on the political agenda.
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